Interesting Sixth Circuit Opinion regarding Miranda Rights And Public Safety Exception

An interesting opinion, especially in light of the recent Boston Marathon bombing and subsequent arrest, is the Sixth Circuit case of U.S. v. Hodge. In Hodge, a suspect’s home was raided by police and a bomb was discovered after the suspect divulged its existence during questioning by police that took place without reading the suspect his Miranda rights. The issue before the court was whether evidence of the bomb gleaned from his statements to police should be suppressed. The Sixth Circuit held: no, it should not, that the questioning was valid due to the public safety exception to Miranda.

The case began when an informant approached police in Calhoun County, Michigan to say that an acquaintance, Lonnie Hodge, was using a one pot meth making method known as “shake and bake.” The method requires combining the ingredients of methamphetamine into a single bottle and shaking it until the drug is properly formed. The informant further said that Hodge had a pipe bomb and a black rifle that he suspected was an AK-47.

The police investigated Hodge by going through the list of pseudoephedrine purchasers and coordinating with neighboring police departments who were also investigating the man. After gathering sufficient evidence, the police were able to obtain a search warrant for Hodge’s home.

When police arrived things did not begin well. They knocked down the door to be greeted by a 6-foot 6, 320-pound Hodge waiving a screwdriver and screaming incoherently. Eventually Hodge was subdued and removed from the premises for questioning. A few minutes later, once Hodge calmed down, an officer asked whether Hodge he had anything in his house such as a meth lab or a pipe bomb that could hurt officers. Hodge said no. A few minutes later Hodge said that there was a bomb in the house. The police then pressed him for more information and he admitted that there was a pipe bomb, giving the location of the device that was eventually disarmed by the bomb expert. A subsequent search of the house uncovered drugs, though not meth, and a black rifle.

Hodge asked the trial court to suppress evidence of the pipe bomb, saying that the officer’s failure to read him his Miranda rights meant that the fruits of the interrogation should be inadmissible in court. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the bomb should be admitted given the pubic safety exception established by the Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles as well as the inevitable discovery doctrine.

The Sixth Circuit said that in some cases “overriding considerations of public safety” can permit officers to omit reading a suspect his or her Miranda rights before questioning. The Court held that because bombs, especially pipe bombs, are by their very nature unstable and could explode at any time, they posed a real and present danger to all the officers at Hodge’s house.

Additionally, the Sixth Circuit wrote that even if a Miranda violation had occurred, the pipe bomb would still not be suppressed due to the inevitable discovery doctrine. This is because the police had a valid warrant to search the home and, given the bomb’s location, would have eventually discovered it even without Hodge warning them in advance.

To read the full opinion, click here.

Lying to Probation Officer is a Federal Crime

By Lee Davis
United States v. Vreeland

Everyone knows that a person has the right to remain silent when faced with questioning by police and most people understand that you have the right to have an attorney present during questioning. Perhaps fewer people know that it is a crime to lie to federal agents.

In Vreeland, the court was faced with these issues in the context of a man who lied to his probation officer during his monthly probation meeting. Vreeland denied knowing a man involved in a crime. He too was a suspect in this crime. His probation officer pressed on these facts. Vreeland's statements are what formed the basis of both a probation violation and the substantive new crime of lying to the PO--a federal agent. This is a novel issue in the Sixth Circuit.

In Vreeland the Court was face with two questions: whether his false statements to a probation officer during the course of a monthly supervisory meeting are protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and whether such statements fall within the “judicial function exception” to prosecution set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b). The answer to both questions is no.

The Court reasoned that:
We have held that “the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing in the context of a meeting with a probation officer.” United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1326 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant’s voluntary revelation to his probation officer during a presentence meeting that he regularly purchased cocaine to support his habit, resulting in the probation officer’s recalculation of the defendant’s base offense level and sentencing range for his drug offense, was not a compelled incrimination); see also United States v. Humphrey, 34 F.3d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[U]nless a state overtly threatens to revoke probation in retaliation for the legitimate exercise of the self-incrimination privilege, there is no reasonable basis for a probationer to believe that his Fifth Amendment rights are in jeopardy.”) (citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 438).

As to the notion that these are protected communications that are not subject to prosecution, the Court rejected that idea.
A meeting between a probation officer and a defendant under supervision is not a “judicial proceeding” protected by § 1001(b) because it serves an administrative, not an adjudicative, function.

Vreeland received a two year sentence for lying to his PO and an additional two years for his probation violation.

The full opinion can be found here.

Sixth Circuit Finds Policer Officer Use of Force Reasonable

• MITCH HAYDEN V. PONTIAC POLICE OFFICER DWIGHT GREEN

Today the Sixth Circuit found that Pontiac Michigan Police Officer Dwight Green used reasonable force in this case involving the stop of a motorist and his forceful removal of the driver.  Hayden, the driver, was involved in an accident with another motorist and left the scene without giving his contact information or speaking to the police.  Officer Green spoted Hayden a short ditance from the accident and attempted to stop him.  When that failed, he used more forceful actions that Hayden objected to and that were the subject of this federal lawsuit.

The question is whether there was any constitutional violation here. In Hayden’s view, Green violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “the use of excessive force by arresting and investigating officers.” Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2006). We decide that issue based on “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). In evaluating whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable rather than excessive, we consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Smoak, 460 F.3dat 783 (internal quotation marks omitted). “This standard contains a built-in measure of deference to the officer’s on-the-spot judgment about the level of force necessary in light of the circumstances of the particular case.”

The Court found that Officer Green is immune from suit.  

Supreme Court to Consider Whether State Court Judge Can Jail Person Without Appointing Counsel

*Turner v. Rogers


On Wednesday, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in a case that will determine whether a state court judge can jail a person for contempt without appointing an attorney to represent him.

In Turner, the Court will consider: 1) Whether an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a civil contempt proceeding that results in his incarceration; and 2) whether the Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Turner argues the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution guarantee him, as an indigent defendant in state court, the right to appointed counsel before being sentenced to one year imprisonment for civil contempt. The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed.

SCOTUS

Of significance will be if the court will find that it has jurisdiction to hear the case; and, then if they do, will they establish a rule that state court judges must appoint counsel for defendants who cannot afford counsel prior to jailing a person. Such a rule would have implications in Tennessee courts for violations of such things as varied as child support, contempt of court, or failing a drug test. If the Court finds that they have jurisdiction over what has previously been a state court matter then this will be a decision to watch for 2011.