Tennessee Supreme Court Excuses Prisoner's Failure to Meet Post-Conviction Deadline

By Stevie Phillips

In 2003, prisoner Artis Whitehead tried to rob BB King's Blues Club on Beale Street in downtown Memphis.  He was convicted of a variety of offenses surrounding the incident.  The TN appellate courts affirmed his convictions, and the US Supreme Court declined to hear his case.  Up to that point, he had an attorney.

Afterwards and without a lawyer, Mr. Whitehead filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court.  That court dismissed the petition because it was filed late.  The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for a hearing, but the trial court again declined to excuse Mr. Whitehead's late filing.  This time on appeal, the TN Supreme Court issued a divided opinion.

Both the majority and dissent analyzed this case under Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010) and Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012), two US Supreme Court cases holding, essentially, that a prisoner's late filing should be excused if 1) he was diligently pursing his rights and some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from filing his petition on time and 2) the prisoner’s attorney abandoned the prisoner or acted against the prisoner’s interests.

J. Koch, writing for the majority, held that Mr. Whitehead's attorney effectively abandoned him, which created an exceptional circumstance that prevented him from filing his petition on time. Specifically, Mr. Whitehead's lawyer delayed in informing him that the US Supreme Court had declined to hear his case and in forwarding his case files and also gave Mr. Whitehead an incorrect filing deadline.

J. Holder authored a dissent in which she distinguished these facts from Holland and Maples:

"The petitioners in Holland and Maples were not only the victims of attorney mistakes and communication failures, but each petitioner also erroneously believed his attorney was pursuing his legal matter on his behalf."  In J. Holder's view, the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that "Mr. Whitehead never operated under the misconception that the pursuit of post-conviction relief was not his responsibility or that his former appellate attorney was pursuing his post-conviction claim." 

Read J. Koch's majority opinion and J. Holder's dissent.

Sixth Circuit Hears Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Appeal From Lillelid Murderer

The recently decided Sixth Circuit case of Howell v. Hodge began in 1997 when Karen Howell and five of her friends set off from Pikeville, Kentucky to New Orleans. At the time, Howell was only 17-years-old, another of the group was 14 and the rest were over 18. The group of friends brought two guns with them on their journey and discussed forcibly trading in their broken down car for a newer one along the way.

While stopped in Greeneville, Tennessee, an opportunity to steal a better car presented itself. A Jehovah’s Witness, Vidar Lillelid, came up to Howell and her friends and began to share his religious views. One of Howell’s compatriots brandished a gun and walked Lillelid back to his family’s van despite Mr. Lillelid’s offer of his wallet and his keys. The group ended up ordering Lillelid to pull over on a secluded stretch of road, at which point, all four members of the family were shot multiple times. The only person to survive was the Lillelid’s two-year-old son who lost an eye in the attack.

Howell and her group attempted to flee to Mexico but were caught in Arizona after failing to cross the border. Howell and her friends still had several of the Lillelid’s possessions when they were apprehended.

Prosecutors in Tennessee then filed charges and initially sought the death penalty. In exchange for dropping the death penalty charges, the group pled guilty to the crime, with Howell and the other minor pleading guilty in adult court. Howell was eventually sentenced to three life sentences to be served consecutively without the possibility of parole.

Howell then filed a petition for relief, claiming that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. She said that her attorney at the time should have insisted that she take a psychological evaluation to determine if her mental state required that she be committed to a psychiatric institution, which would have prevented her being transferred to adult court. The case made its way to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which found that although the attorney had indeed been deficient, Howell was not able to show prejudice.

The Sixth Circuit agreed to hear the case and laid out that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a claimant must show that deficient performance resulted in prejudice. The Sixth Circuit agreed with lower courts that there were reasonable grounds to believe Howell was not “committable” at the time of her trial. Thus, her attorney’s lack of action to get her a psychological evaluation does not prove prejudice. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit says that for a claimant to make such an ineffective assistance claim, he or she must establish that, but for their counsel’s ineffectiveness, he or she would not have pled guilty and would instead have gone to trial. Howell never says that, just that she might have been committed to an institution for a brief period of time for evaluation.

The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed the conviction and the ruling of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Court found that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel is a demanding one that requires claimants prove that the likelihood of a different result is substantial, not just conceivable.

To read the full opinion, click here.

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By Lee Davis

Defendant Charged with Animal Cruelty Denied Pretrial Diversion

By Stevie Phillips

On January 23, Justice Lee authored a unanimous Tennessee Supreme Court opinion in Stanton v. State of Tennessee.

In sum, Stanton, a farmer in Warren County, was indicted under T.C.A. 39-14-202(a)(2) on 16 counts of animal cruelty for the intentional or knowing failure to provide necessary food, care, and shelter to horses.  Stanton pled not guilty and applied for pretrial diversion pursuant to T.C.A. 40-15-105(a)(1)(A). The Assistant District Attorney denied Stanton’s application. Stanton filed a petition for writ of cert in the trial court, which found that the ADA had not abused his discretion. The TSC affirmed. 

The Court’s analysis centers on a prosecuting attorney’s “exclusive” discretion to grant or deny pretrial diversion.  Prosecutors will find this opinion helpful because it clearly states what they need to do to ensure that a denial of pretrial diversion withstands scrutiny on appeal.  

Specifically, the prosecuting attorney must consider all factors, including “the circumstances of the offense; the defendant’s amenability to correction; any factors that tend to accurately reflect whether the defendant will become a repeat offender; the defendant’s criminal record, social history, and physical and mental condition; the need for general deterrence; and ‘the likelihood that pretrial diversion will serve the ends of justice and the best interest of both the public and the defendant.’”

In addition, a prosecutor's denial must be in writing.  The written denial must enumerate the factors considered, provide a factual basis for each factor, enumerate the weight accorded to each factor, and identify any disputes between the evidence relied upon by the ADA and the evidence in the application filed by the defendant. 

Finally, the Court noted that it had not previously addressed whether a defendant’s failure to take responsibility might serve as a basis for denying pretrial diversion.  The Court concluded that “a defendant’s unwillingness to admit wrongdoing and assume responsibility for his or her actions is relevant in assessing a defendant’s amenability to correction and whether pretrial diversion will satisfy the need for deterrence and serve the ends of justice.”  

TN Supreme Court Refuses to Overturn Man’s Felony Murder Conviction

The Tennessee Supreme Court recently denied an appeal by a man from Knoxville attempting to have his felony murder conviction overturned. The man, Travis Kinte Echols, had been sentenced to life in prison and appealed claiming that there had been a number of errors during his trial.

Echols claimed that the trial court failed to suppress a statement the defendant made to the police which he said was the product of an unlawful arrest. Echols appealed his case to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals which found that the arrest lacked probable cause. Despite the unlawful arrest, the Court of Appeals said that the statement qualified as harmless error and thus did not serve as grounds for reversal.

Echols appealed again and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. In a unanimous decision, the justices rejected Echols’ argument that his conviction should be reversed because the police did not have probable cause when they arrested him back in 2005.

Echols was arrested and ultimately convicted of murdering Robert Steely in the parking lot of the Townview Towers apartment complex in East Knoxville. During his interrogation, Echols waived his right to remain silent and, in the course of a conversation with officers, admitted to shooting Steely, but said that he only did so in self-defense. Specifically, Echols admitted to shooting Steely and then disposing of the weapon. This claim of self-defense did not ring true to the jury and they found him guilty of felony murder during a robbery of Steely, ultimately sentencing him to life in prison.

The Supreme Court heard the case and disagreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals. The High Court ruled that the police were able to establish probable cause for the warrantless arrest of Echols and, given this probably cause, the statement Echols later made to investigators was admissible at trial. The Supreme Court did find that the trial court incorrectly limited cross-examination of two witnesses, but that these errors were harmless and did not affect the final result of the trial. As such, the judgment of the lower court convicting Echols of felony murder was upheld.

To read the full opinion, click here.

State v. Bise: New Standard of Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions

By Stevie Phillips

In a unanimous Tennessee Supreme Court opinion handed down on September 26, Chief Justice Wade outlines the historical development of state and federal sentencing guidelines.

In short, he observes that the 2005 amendments to Tennessee's 1989 Sentencing Act were passed for the purpose of bringing our sentencing scheme in line with United States Supreme Court sentencing decisions, namely Apprendi and its progeny.  This is the first time since the passage of those amendments that the Tennessee Supreme Court has had an opportunity to address the effect of those Supreme Court decisions on Tennessee's standard of appellate review. 

In the view of the Court, the effect is that "de novo appellate review and the 'presumption of correctness' [has] ceased to be relevant.  Instead, sentences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range are to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a 'presumption of reasonableness.'"

You can read the full opinion here. 

Charges of Terrorism in Tennessee Often Fall Apart

A report out of The Tennessean has shown that the state is falling down when it comes to terrorism prosecutions, a charge that is apparently difficult to have stick. The paper found that only nine people in the state have been arrested on terrorism charges since the state’s laws went into effect in 2002. All but one of the defendants either had their charges dismissed or were convicted on lesser charges.

The law in Tennessee makes it a felony to commit any crime intended to “intimidate or coerce” civilians or the government or to disrupt government. The offense is punishable by up to 25 years in prison for a first offense.

The exact reason for why terrorism charges are so hard to make stick is difficult to pin down. It could be many things; mental illness on the part of the defendant will often excuse or reduce the charges. Prosecutors often end up taking into consideration the intent of the defendant making the threats as the words may have been said as a result of extreme emotional distress on their parts and not meant to actually cause harm.

Davidson County recently saw their first such terrorism–related arrest when Amal Abdullahi told a CEVA Logistics co-worker on September 1 that she was ready to die for Allah and that America was full of nonbelievers who should die. Police said she also told the co-worker that nobody pays any attention to her and “she should pick up a gun and shoot all these people.”

The incident was not reported to police until September 6, and CEVA could not be reached for comment. Abdullahi is currently free on $50,000 bond after family was able to post her bail. She is expected to be in court again on October 10 and has retained an attorney

Another terrorism-related arrest that fizzled happened in 2008, when a Middle Tennessee State University student was arrested after, police said, he set fire to his dorm and threatened large-scale devastation on the campus. Rather than admit to terrorism, he pleaded guilty to charges of setting fire to personal property and filing a false report.

On Halloween 2010, a local guy in Chattanooga was arrested on a terrorism charge after he called 911 to say there was an active shooter and several people had been wounded in the fictitious attack. Again, prosecutors dropped the terrorism charge and the man eventually pled guilty to a charge of making a false report.

Source: “TN terrorism charges are rarely upheld,” by Brian Haas, published at WBIR.com.

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The Tennessee Supreme Court on Passing Worthless Checks

By Stevie Phillips

Justice Janice M. Holder, in a unanimous decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court, held yesterday that the misdemeanor "crime of passing worthless checks involves an element of dishonesty or false statement" and can therefore be used to impeach a defendant's credibility so long as its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

Under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), a witness may be impeached with a prior conviction if the crime involves dishonesty or false statement.   Here, the defendant, Wanda F. Russell, argued that an honest mistake can result in a conviction for passing a worthless check.

In determining whether a crime qualifies, a court assesses the elements of the offense, not the circumstances surrounding its commission. Here, the Court applied the rules of statutory construction to the statute setting out the crime of passing worthless checks, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-121(a)(1). The Court concluded that the statute only criminalizes dishonest conduct, not honest mistakes.

Read the full opinion here.

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Supreme Court Affirms Judgment Against Georgia Crematory Operator For Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Resulting from Mishandling of Corpse

09/21/12
Nashville, Tenn. – The Tennessee Supreme Court today upheld the jury verdict against T. Ray Brent Marsh, operator of the Tri-State Crematory in Noble, Georgia, resulting from Marsh’s mishandling of a corpse.

In February of 2002, authorities discovered that Marsh had not been cremating bodies that were sent to Tri-State for cremation, but rather burying or dumping the bodies on Tri-State property. The investigation recovered bodies and body parts of approximately 230 persons in widely varying states of decay. Dr. Rondal D. Akers, Jr. and Lucinda Akers sued Marsh for mishandling their deceased son’s body, which had been sent to Tri-State for cremation, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and bailment. The jury awarded Dr. Akers damages in the amount of $275,000 and Mrs. Akers damages in the amount of $475,000.

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Sharon G. Lee, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the evidence supported the jury verdict for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and bailment claims. The Court found no error in the trial court’s jury instruction that the jury could draw a negative inference from Marsh’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refusal to answer questions during his pre-trial deposition in this civil case.

To read the Rondal Akers v. Prime Succession of Tennessee opinion authored by Justice Sharon G. Lee, visit http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/akersrondal

TN Supreme Court Reiterates Definition of “Serious Bodily Injury”

The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled in a recent opinion, State of Tennessee v. Michael Farmer and Anthony Clark, that a gunshot wound is not necessarily the same thing as a serious bodily injury. The state’s high court clarified the legal standards in an opinion published late last month in the case of two men found guilty of especially aggravated robbery for shooting a man in the leg during a 2008 Memphis robbery.

The victim, Terrell Westbrooks, was shot while trying to flee from the two burglars who burst into an apartment where he and a friend were illegally purchasing prescription painkillers. Westbrooks testified that he did not at first realize he had been shot, a through and through injury that left surprisingly little damage. In fact, Westbrooks said that he was treated at a hospital and released in around an hour.

The opinion, written by Justice Sharon G. Lee, said the prosecutors failed to show that Westbrooks was at risk of dying, lost consciousness or suffered extreme pain, disfigurement or substantial impairment. Those are the standards spelled out in the state statutes that define serious bodily injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(34) states that  “serious bodily injury” is defined as “bodily injury that involves: (A) A substantial risk of death; (B) Protracted unconsciousness; (C) Extreme physical pain; (D) Protracted or obvious disfigurement; [or] (E) Protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty.”

As a result of the failure to demonstrate the statutory definition, the Court threw out the especially aggravated robbery convictions for Anthony Clark and Michael Farmer. It instead ordered the trial court to sentence the two on the much less serious charge of aggravated robbery.

In a concurring opinion, Justice William C. Koch Jr. said the case demonstrated the need for criminal prosecutions going forward to use expert medical testimony when trying to prove serious bodily injury. “We should candidly acknowledge that some injuries which appear bloody and gruesome to laypersons may not have a substantial risk of death, while other injuries that are seemingly benign might, in fact, pose a substantial risk of death.”

To read the full opinion, click here.

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