Baumgartner’s Attorneys Get Three Months to Prepare

The Knoxville case involving disgraced former judge Richard Baumgartner moved forward last week with news that his defense attorneys, Don Bosch and Ann Short, filed a motion before U.S. Magistrate Judge Clifford Shirley asking that he declare the case “complex.” 

Though the name may seem odd and beside the point, it’s important to a case’s timeline. If a case is declared “complex” it will give the defense more time to review discovery submitted by the prosecution, postponing the currently scheduled July 18 trial. 

Bosch and Short told Judge Shirley that they had only begun to scratch the surface of the voluminous discovery turned over by the government. Moreover, for them to do their jobs properly they’ll need additional time to review everything and properly brief their client. They state that the July 18 date currently set for trial is inappropriate given the amount of work still left to do.

Federal prosecutors disagreed, saying that the defense was only seeking a delay for delay’s sake. They raised that Bosch and Short represented Baumgartner back in 2011 when he pled guilty to one count of official misconduct. The TBI had initiated an investigation of him in 2010 and after news came to light of his misdeeds the government offered a deal to avoid further damage to the Knox County criminal justice system. Given that both Bosch and Short reviewed all the evidence at the time, the prosecution now says their claims of unpreparedness are ridiculous. The prosecutors wrote, “It is unlikely that defense counsel would have advised defendant to plead guilty to a felony in state court without first evaluating the evidence against defendant.”

The defense counters saying that the investigation against their client was continued by the TBI after the plea deal was accepted and that, as a result, mountains of new information remains to be reviewed. Interviews were conducted and filed were gathered, none of which were available the first time around. 

It was announced later last week that Judge Shirley approved a deal struck between the two sides granting a three-month continuance, so that trial is not set to begin until October 23^rd. This amounts to a victory for both sides. The defense received a delay and longer time to review and prepare their case. The prosecution avoided having the trial labeled “complex” and kept the case subject to the federal speedy trial act. 

Though Baumgartner pled guilty to avoid further prosecution just like the one currently proceeding, further allegations of misconduct that he was not initially charged with have since been unearthed. These include his doctor shopping, using his mistress (one of his own Drug Court graduates, Denna Castleman) to get pills, using his influence to help her avoid trouble with prosecutors and judges, lying about being her lawyer and helping her hide a failed drug test. His actions with Castleman are at the heart of the current federal case filed in May. Baumgartner is currently charged with and scheduled for trial on July 18^th for seven counts of misprision of a felony. Each count accuses him of either covering up Castleman’s crimes or failing to report them to the proper authorities. Misprision of a felony carries a maximum prison term of three years. 

Yet another interesting twist occurred earlier last week when, on Wednesday, U.S. District Judge Thomas Phillips, who was scheduled to preside over Baumgartner’s trial, recused himself. Phillips has not released any word as to why he asked to have the case reassigned and the decision now rests in the hands of Chief U.S. District Judge Curtis Collier to assign Phillips’ replacement.

Source: “Baumgartner seeks delay in his federal trial,” by Jamie Satterfield, published at KnoxNews.com.

See Our Related Blog Posts:

The Baumgartner Debacle Continues

Judge Baumgartner Saga Continues 

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Finds Career Criminal Not Entitled to Alternative Sentencing

by Bryan Hoss

• State of Tennessee v. William Henry Wiggins

The defendant, William Henry Wiggins, was convicted in Davidson County Circuit Court of felony possession of a controlled substance, in this case oxycodone, and a violation of the state’s sex offender registry. He was ordered to serve a six-year sentence in prison which he then appealed claiming insufficient evidence and an excessive punishment. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s initial decision. 

When Wiggins was indicted for possession and a sex offender registry violation the grand jury indictment indicated his five prior convictions for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The evidence presented at trial consisted of testimony by officers that they observed a car where Wiggins was the passenger cruising a gas station in search of drugs. When the officers pulled the car over and ran the driver’s and passenger’s names against their database they discovered Wiggins had a warrant out for a sex offender registration violation. When he was arrested, Wiggins admitted to having some pain pills given to him by the driver of the car in exchange for gas money. 

On appeal Wiggins claimed that the state failed to show that he knowingly possessed a controlled substance, believing them to be “pain pills” and not a controlled narcotic. The Court pointed out that Wiggins did not dispute that he possessed the pills or that oxycodone is a controlled substance, he only claimed that he did not know what he was given was oxycodone. The Court disagreed, citing evidence of a prescription label found in the car Wiggins was arrested in and Wiggins’ own statements to officers concerning the pills he had in his pocket. 

Regarding Wiggins’ contention that the length of confinement was too severe, the Court noted that the trial court found him to be a Range III, career criminal and thus not a good candidate for alterative sentencing. The trial court considered the possibility of probation but rejected it in favor of the minimum prison sentence allowed for his crimes. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that Wiggins does not admit to having a drug problem, making rehabilitation next to impossible. Given his status as a career criminal, the Court found Wiggins’ initial sentence proper.

To read the full opinion, click here.

Earlier:

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Discusses Factors for Determining Whether a Plea was Voluntary and Intelligent

TN Court of Criminal Appeals Finds Video Must Be Reviewed by Trial Court

TN Court of Criminal Appeals Says Petition Regarding 1988 Drug Conviction is Moot

• Joby Lee Teal v. The Criminal Court of Shelby County, Tennessee

Joby Lee Teal, a pro se petitioner, sought declaratory judgment concerning the legality of his five 1988 convictions for drug offenses and resulting concurrent five-year sentences. He argues the sentences are void because he committed them while on bail and should have received consecutive sentences. The Criminal Court of Shelby County found that such relief was not available because the five concurrent sentences had expired and the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed. 

The plea deal was struck with deal in November of 1988 and his negotiated sentence expired in 1993. It’d odd then that so many years later, in 2011, Teal filed a pro se petition attacking the five-year sentences he received back in the 80s. He claimed the original trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter concurrent sentences for felony offenses he committed while released on bail. 

The Court of Criminal Appeals discussed the state’s Declaratory Judgment Act, found in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-14-102, which states:

1. Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions have the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
2. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.
3. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

The Court said that Tennessee law is clear that in order to maintain an action for declaratory judgment, a justiciable controversy must exist. The question before the court must be a real one, not simply a theoretical one. The Court says that even a simple review of the records shows that Teal’s claim is moot because it lost its “character as a present, live controversy.” 

Because Teal did not pursue this remedy during the time available to him and because he has long since completed the sentence about which he now complains, the Court can do nothing today. Apparently the return address on Teal’s brief indicated he is currently residing at the Federal Correctional Institute in Memphis, Tennessee. The fact that he is currently incarcerated on unrelated charges does not help the fact that the underlying claim before the court is moot.  

To read the full opinion, click here.

See Our Related Blog Posts:

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Discusses Factors for Determining Whether a Plea was Voluntary and Intelligent

TN Court of Criminal Appeals Finds Video Must Be Reviewed by Trial Court

Tennessee Supreme Court to revisit "constructive possession" in State v. Robinson

by Jay Perry

It’s not an uncommon situation: late at night a car full of people is pulled over by police.  Inside the car the police find some illicit drugs, but no one claims them.  Who do the drugs belong to?  This is a key question because here in Tennessee it unlawful to manufacture, sell, deliver or possess a controlled substance.  It is not a crime to be in the presence of a controlled substance.  Often in situations like these, where the owner is unknown, the police officer will charge everyone inside the car with possession of the drugs.     

Tennessee law recognizes two kinds of possession: actual and constructive.  Actual possession is simple- everyone understands that if you have something in your hands or on your person you are in actual possession of it.  Constructive possession is trickier, however, and the courts have defined it in different ways.  Commonly, constructive possession requires that the person knowingly have the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over an object.  Simply put, “constructive possession is the ability to reduce an object to actual possession.”  United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 495 (5^th Cir. 1979).  To illustrate this concept, consider your household possessions.  While at work you are not in actual possession of any of the things at your home.  However, you are in constructive possession because you have both the power and ability to actually and legitimately possess these things.  Going one step further, while watching football at the home of a friend, are you in constructive possession of their television?  Clearly not.  Even though you are in the presence of the television, you do not have the power to take it into actual possession. 

The definition of constructive possession and its application in actual trials remains slippery and difficult for juries to apply.  The Tennessee Supreme Court recently agreed to explore the issue by granting certiorari to hear the defendant’s appeal in the case of Tennessee v. Bobby Lee Robinson.  In the case the defendant was convicted of the possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class A felony.  The cocaine had been found in the center console and the floor of a car in which the defendant was a passenger.  However, nothing was directly found on Mr. Robinson, and there was considerable evidence from a search of the co-defendant’s house that the co-defendant had been running a drug selling operation. 

It is likely that the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, a conviction based on constructive possession, to shed some light on this difficult legal concept.  While appellate courts are typically loathe to overturn a jury verdict, such a reversal may be what they are contemplating.  It will be interesting to see what they have to say.  After all, “freedom is a possession of inestimable value.”  

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: Sentence can be revisited if ‘based on’ revised crack cocaine guidelines

by Lee Davis

• US v. MICHAEL D. JACKSON

FSA: challenges powder v. crack

This appeal arises from the conviction of Michael Jackson after pleading guilty in June 2009 to one count of intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine. Jackson was found to be a Career Offender. The district court delayed his sentencing for more than a year, anticipating Congress was about to pass a new law regarding crack cocaine sentencing guidelines. The court felt it could not wait any longer and sentenced Jackson on July 16, 2010.

Jackson filed a timely notice of appeal. The Fair Sentencing Act was passed almost immediately thereafter, on August 3, 2010. At Jackson’s sentencing, the district court discussed at length the terrible disparity between the crack and powder cocaine sentencing guidelines. The district court clearly wanted Jackson to have a more fair sentence but felt its hands were tied. The district court ultimately decided to grant a 38-month downward variance from the Career Offender guideline.

Jackson seeks a remand to the district court for re-sentencing in light of the recent reduction in crack cocaine sentences. The government contends no reduction should be allowed given that his sentence was based on the Career Offender guidelines and not the crack cocaine guidelines. The Sixth Circuit recognized that Jackson’s criminal history meant that the Career Offender guidelines had to be considered but held that the district court should have the opportunity to revisit the sentence in light of new crack cocaine sentencing guidelines.

What appears to have happened is that the district court varied downward from the Career Offender guideline to a sentence more in lie with the what it believed was reasonable given the crack versus powder cocaine disparity. The Sixth Circuit says it believes had the revised guidelines been in place, it is clear the district court would have sentenced Jackson to a reduced sentence. Because the district court found Jackson to be a Career Offender and then sentenced him below the range for Career Offenders, noting a disagreement with crack guidelines, it is clear to the Sixth Circuit that the sentence was “based on” the crack guidelines as much as the Career Offender guidelines.

The Court further discussed the instruction in Freeman v. United States to:

… isolate whatever marginal effect the since-rejected Guideline had on the defendant’s sentence. Working backwards from this purpose, §3582(c)(2) modification proceedings should be available to permit the district court to revisit a prior sentence to whatever extent the sentencing range in question was a relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence.

The majority held that the crack cocaine guidelines were clearly a relevant part of the analytic framework used by the district court to determine Jackson’s sentence. The Sixth Circuit was clear to take no position regarding whether Jackson’s sentence should be changed, but remanded the decision to the district court to consider the retroactive crack cocaine guidelines. 

To read the full opinion, click here.

See Our Related Blog Posts:

Supreme Court hears argument on cocaine cases

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Lee Davis practices law in federal court in the sixth circuit representing people in federal cases.

Governor Haslam Encourages a $6 Million Crime Prevention Plan for Tennessee

The Tennessean reported Friday that Governor Haslam has devised a plan to help prevent crime and reduce the amount of violent crimes in the state of Tennessee. The estimated total cost of the plan is around $6 Million.

Violent crime has become a huge concern for the citizens of Tennessee, most recently in Chattanooga where there has been a definite increase in shootings and other violent crime. Many blame gang activity and various drug activity. As we have witnessed in recent months, the combination of both can prove particularly dangerous.

The plan focuses on three areas: decreasing violent crime, cutting the rate at which criminals commit new crimes, and reducing prescription and methamphetamine abuse.

Here is a rundown of the different aspects of the proposed plan:

• Domestic Violence: One of the aspects of the plan would impose mandatory minimum sentences for domestic violence offenses. A second domestic violence offense would receive a mandatory minimum of 45 days in prison; a third offense would receive a mandatory minimum of 120 days in prison. The proposed legislation dealing with domestic violence stems from a study conducted in October that ranked Tennessee the 5th in the nation in murders of women by men.

• Gang-Related crimes: The plan includes increased penalties for felons involved in gang-related crime, and reducing the rate at which a criminal commits a new crime. Specifically, legislation would target groups of three or more people who commit violent crimes. These groups would receive a harsher penalty for gang-related crime. Further, specific crimes frequently associated with gang activity will receive an increased penalty. These include: aggravated assaults and robberies and aggravated burglaries.

• Pill abuse: The proposed measures involving drug-related crimes include a system for cleaning noxious meth labs, improving the state database that tracks the sale of pseudoephedrine, better training state troopers on drug interdiction, and shift non-violent drug offenders from prison to local drug court programs.

Haslam's plan has its fair share of critics. Some of those against the legislation include defense attorneys who are wary of mandatory minimum sentencing. This is because specific circumstances of a case cannot be taken into account when there is a mandatory minimum sentence in place for a certain crime. Funding is also a big issue. While moving non-violent drug offenders to drug court programs is a great suggestion, many wonder where the funding for that type of movement will originate. Many are worried that the increased penalties for domestic violence offenders will begin to overcrowd the prisons. Prison administrators state the prisons are already filled to capacity with some exceeding capacity.

Even given the criticism, there seems to be overall support for Haslam's plan, particularly for the provisions involving drug-related crimes.

Many of these proposed laws are likely to come up in the upcoming session of the Tennessee Legislature. If passed, they will take effect later this year.

Sixth Circuit Reverses District Court's Refusal to Suppress Evidence Resulting From an Unreasonable Search and Seizure

• United States v. Beauchamp

The Sixth Circuit decided U.S. v. Gevoyl Beauchamp, yesterday. Beauchamp pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine but later appealed arguing that the District Court was wrong when it refused to suppress evidence of drugs found pursuant to a search of Beauchamp. Specifically, he argued that the search of his person was unlawfully conducted.  It was without reasonable suspicion.

At 2:30 am on February 15, 2008 law enforcement was patrolling near the Jacob Price housing project in Covington, Kentucky due to an increase in drug activity. Officer Dees saw Beauchamp talking with another individual. When Beauchamp saw the officer, he hurriedly walked away without making eye contact. Officer Dees told his partner, Officer Fain to stop the "suspicious subject." Officer Fain followed Beauchamp in his patrol car, parking next to an iron fence where Beauchamp stood. He told Beauchamp to stop and walk back towards his patrol car. The officer testified that he looked "very nervous, visibly shaking." Officer Fain asked Beauchamp where he had been and where he was going. Beauchamp gave vague answers but complied with the officer's requests. Officer Fain then frisked Beauchamp for weapons. While conducting the frisk, he asked Beauchamp if he had anything the officer should be aware of. Beauchamp replied that he did not. The Officer didn't find any weapons, but then asked Beauchamp if he could conduct a further search. Beauchamp said yes. Officer Fain noticed plastic hidden in Beauchamp's underwear.

Officer Dees then arrived and recognized Beauchamp from previous encounters. Officer Fain gave Officer Dees a look indicating he found something while conducting the search. Once Officer Dees began to search his pants, Beauchamp tried to run. He was stopped and Officer Fain found the plastic which contained rocks of crack cocaine.

Beauchamp filed a motion to suppress the evidence found from the search at trial, but the district court refused. He appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Court began its analysis by stating that there are three different types of permissible encounters between civilians and police officers: 1) consensual encounters which may be initiated without any form of suspicion; 2) the investigative detention, which if non-consensual, must be supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and 3) the arrest, valid only if supported by probable cause. Since the Fourth Amendment applies to all searches and seizures, the Court first analyzed whether the stop of Beauchamp was a seizure, warranting Fourth Amendment protection. A seizure occurs when, after looking at all circumstances surrounding the event, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. The Court held that a reasonable person in Beauchamp's position would not believe that he was free to leave. He had been pursued by both officers and instructed to stop and walk back towards Officer Fain. After being pursued by both officers, Beauchamp would have been reasonable in believing that the two officers were targeting him, thus believing that he was not free to leave. The Court held that this was a seizure and that the seizure occurred once Beauchamp and Officer Fain spoke at the fence.

The Court then analyzed whether the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop and search Beauchamp. In order to do so, the Court had to examine the totality of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the stop. There were five facts the district court alluded to: that Beauchamp was 1) recognized by an officer from previous encounters, 2) at 2:30 in the morning, 3) in a housing project that was the source of many drug complaints, 4) with another individual, and 5) he hurriedly walked away from the police while avoiding eye contact.

The court stated that the first fact is not applicable to this analysis because Officer Dees only recognized Beauchamp after the search had already begun. The second and third facts, the court said, should be applied carefully. The Court explained that just because Beauchamp was in a drug-prone housing project at 2:30 in the morning, was not enough to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Officer Dees did not see Beauchamp engage in anything resembling drug activity; all he saw was Beauchamp with another person before he walked away. The fourth fact - that Beauchamp was seen with another person - is not indicative of criminal activity. The fifth fact - hurriedly walking away from the officer without making eye contact - is also not enough to establish reasonable suspicion. The Sixth Circuit has regularly held that merely walking away from the police, without any other suspicious conduct, does not establish reasonable suspicion.

Without reasonable suspicion, the search of Beauchamp was unlawful. The Court further held that although Beauchamp consented to a search of his person, consent that is obtained after an illegal seizure is tainted and does not justify a search. This rule was articulated by the United States Supreme Court and has been regularly applied in the Sixth Circuit.

Because the initial seizure was unlawful, the subsequent search of Beauchamp was unlawful regardless of his consent. Given this conclusion, the Court held that the evidence should have been suppressed. The Court reversed the District Court and remanded for further proceedings.

The Use of GPS Tracking Devices Without a Warrant is an Upcoming Issue Before the U.S. Supreme Court

Looking ahead at the next U.S. Supreme Court season, one important issue the Court will have to deliberate is whether law enforcement officers need a warrant for the use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect. This is the case of Antoine Jones, a suspected drug trafficker in Washington, D.C. In order to try to tie Jones to a drug house in Maryland, FBI Agents and local law enforcement installed a GPS tracking device on the car registered to Jones' wife. Officers obtained a warrant that permitted a 10-day period of surveillance, but they installed the tracker after the 10 days had expired. Nevertheless, over the next month, law enforcement kept track of every movement of the Jeep, including times when Jones' wife and kids were traveling. Once they tied Jones to the drug house in Maryland, law enforcement was able to execute search warrants for the house and other property. They found large amounts of powder and crack cocaine, and Jones was convicted of conspiring to sell drugs and sentenced to life in prison.

Jones later appealed arguing that the prolonged use of the GPS tracking device without a warrant constituted an illegal search. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Jones' favor, stating that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy and thus was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. The Court's reasoning was that Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements as a whole over that month, and that his actions were not "exposed" to the public (which would negate the need for a warrant). The Court stated this,

"First, unlike one's movements during a single journey, the whole of one's movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is effectively nil. Second, the whole of one's movements is not constructively even though each movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more -- sometimes a great deal more -- than does the sum of its parts."

The government argues that based on U.S. v. Knotts, the installation of the GPS tracker did not require a warrant. Knotts held that officers did not need a warrant to install a beeper tracking device to a barrel of chloroform being transported in order to manufacture illegal drugs. The government argues that the use of a beeper and the use of a more technologically advanced GPS tracking device is one in the same.

Jones' attorney, Stephen Leckar argues, however, that Knotts is different from this case because law enforcement in Knotts had to remain close to the beeper in order for it to work. Therefore, they were already tracking the chloroform barrel themselves; the beeper just "augmented their senses." The GPS tracking device, he says, completely supplants the officers' senses, making the two cases different.

What both sides agree on is that this case may prove to be monumental to the status of the Fourth Amendment. Critics worry that a favorable ruling for Jones would open up many avenues of warrantless surveillance, stomping on the privacy rights of citizens. Many, including John Wesley Hall (a criminal defense attorney in Arkansas), do not believe the government is merely chipping away at the Fourth Amendment; rather, it is being "blasted away."

Continue to check back for updates on this and other upcoming issues in the Supreme Court.

Florida Drug Law Unconstitutional says, Federal Judge

A Federal Judge in Florida has declared that state's drug law unconstitutional. The St. Petersberg Times reports here that:

U.S. District Judge Mary Scriven of Orlando issued a ruling Wednesday that struck down the state's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control law, saying it violates due process because it doesn't require that prosecutors prove that a person knew he or she possessed illegal drugs.

In other words, under existing Florida law all that had to be proven was simply possession not actual knowledge by a person that they knew they possessed illegal drugs. This knowledge requirement or Mens Rea is required in every other state in the country and under federal law. Judge Scriven's ruling is an attempt to get Florida law in conformity with all other jurisdictions in the United States.

6th Circuit Denies Retroactivity of the Fair Sentencing Act

• United States v. Marrero

The 6th Circuit decided Wednesday that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 is not retroactive to the date when a defendant commits an offense. The FSA was enacted to alleviate some of the disparities in sentencing for offenses involving crack cocaine and offenses involving powder cocaine. Specifically, the FSA raises the amounts of crack cocaine required to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence.


Marrero was convicted of possessing 27.25 grams of crack cocaine. He was sentenced on August 11, 2008 to 360 months (30 years) of incarceration. Marrero appealed and argued that the FSA, enacted on August 3, 2010, should apply retroactively. Without FSA amended guidelines, Marrero faced an incarceration range from a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence to a maximum life sentence. With FSA guidelines, Marrero faced no mandatory minimum and a maximum of 30 years.


The 6th circuit refused to apply the FSA retroactively to offence date stating:

"In United States v. Carradine 621 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1706 (2011), this court determined that the Fair Sentencing Act's penalty provisions do not apply to offenses committed prior to their enactment, id at 580 ("The new law at issue here, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, contains no express statement that it is retroactive nor can we infer any such express intent from its plain language. Consequently, we must apply the penalty provision in place at the time [the defendant] committed the crime in question.") Because Carradine is a prior published opinion of this court, we are bound by its pronouncement that the Fair Sentencing Act has no bearing on Marrero's case."

Because Marrero committed his offense prior to the enactment of the FSA, the 6th circuit denied his request for resentencing.


We discussed Chief Judge Curtis Collier's ruling in US v. Toney Robinson, Docket No. 1:10-CR-66 in February from the Eastern District of TN involving whether the FSA applied retroactively to those offenders who committed offenses before enactment, but were sentenced after enactment, here is the post. Today's opinion in Marrero clears up the issue of retroactivity of FSA to offence date but leaves open still other issues.  Read Judge Collier's opinion above for a full discussion.

U.S. Supreme Court: Sentences Cannot be Increased Because of Rehabilitation

• Tapia v. United States

The United States Supreme Court recently held that drug rehabilitation is no longer an appropriate reason for a longer prison sentence. Tapia was given a longer sentence because the Judge wanted to recommend her for the 500-hour drug treatment program offered in U.S. Prisons. The Judge believed Tapia would have a better chance to get into the program if she had a longer sentence, but he could not guarantee Tapia a spot in the program.

Tapia argued that section 3582(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) precludes Judges from considering rehabilitation as a factor when deciding the length of a prison sentence. 3582(a) states:

"The Court, in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation."

The Court looked to the plain meaning of the statute to determine Congress' intent. They began by stating that the definition of "recognize" is "to acknowledge or treat as valid" and that the definition of "appropriate" is something that is "suitable or fitting for a particular purpose". Given these definitions, the Court reasoned that Congress would have them interpret this section as meaning, "that the courts should acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of rehabilitation."

With this interpretation of the statute, the Court held that rehabilitation is not an appropriate reason to impose a longer prison sentence. The Court also noted that if Congress had intended on allowing courts to use rehabilitation as a reason for a longer prison sentence, they would have provided the courts with the authority to ensure those defendants a spot in the 500-hour drug program. Since Congress has not granted this authority, the plain meaning of the statute precludes judges from imposing longer prison sentences because of rehabilitation.

Supreme Court Finds Federal Minimum Sentences for Cocaine Apply to All Forms of Base Cocaine

• DEPIERRE v. UNITED STATES

The Supreme Court decided (9-0) yesterday that the statutory minimum guidelines for cocaine base include all forms of cocaine base, not just what is known as crack cocaine. 

(Photo courtesy of Meli.)

Federal law sets a minimum 10-year sentence for persons convicted of certain drug offenses, 21 U. S. C. §841(a), including those involving 50 grams or more of  “a mixture or substance . . . which contains cocaine base,” §841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and a minimum 5-year sentence for offenses  involving  5  grams  or  more  of  the  same, §841(b)(1)(B)(iii).

We hold that the term “cocaine base” as used in §841(b)(1) means not  just “crack  cocaine,” but cocaine in its chemically basic form.  

In this case, out of the First Circuit, DePierre attempted to distinguish crack cocaine from other types of base cocaine and argued that the federal minimum guidelines only applied to crack. The Supreme Court rejected that argument finding that the mandatory minimums apply to all forms of base cocaine.


The decision does not mean that powder cocaine is covered by these mandatory guidelines as the powder form of cocaine was not contemplated to be included by congress and is a different chemical form of cocaine from base cocaine.