Sixth Circuit Discusses What Makes A Jail Escape A “Crime of Violence”

The case of  U.S. v. Benji Antonio Stout, involved one man’s escape from prison and how that escape should be classified with regard to a subsequent criminal prosecution. The man, Benji Antonio Stout, was charged with knowingly possessing body armor after having previously been convicted of a crime of violence. The previous crime of violence conviction was Stout’s earlier charge of second-degree escape, a conviction he earned from escaping a county jail. During the escape, Stout climbed a wall in the recreation area of the jail and then crawled through a hole in the top of the fence.

Stout and his attorneys argued that the prior conviction did not involve a crime of violence and asked the lower court for a hearing on the matter. The lower court concluded that his escape was a crime of violence given that his escape was purposeful and aggressive and that it created a substantial risk that he would need to use physical force against either guards or members of the public who encountered him during the escape. The fact that he never used such physical force was immaterial.

Stout then appealed the case, claiming essentially the same thing. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the decision of the lower court, holding that the escape amounted to a crime of violence. In its ruling, the Court walked through Kentucky’s statutes dealing with the subject of second-degree escape and determined that the type of escape at issue in this case involved “an escape by leaving custody in a secured setting.” This variety of escape involves a purposeful act and requires stealth and presents the possibility of both detection and ensuing confrontation.

The Sixth Circuit said that 18 U.S.C. Section 16(b) makes clear that a crime of violence includes any that involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense. Under this definition, the Court says it is clear that the Stout’s escape meets the standard and should be properly deemed a crime of violence. As a result, his conviction and sentence were upheld.

In an interesting dissent, Judge Bernice Donald argued that unlike the famous prison escapes mentioned in The Count of Monte Cristo or The Shawshank Redemption, which Donald agrees would qualify as crimes of violence, Stout’s escape was achieved by merely climbing over a wall and crawling through a hole that he was not responsible for creating. Given that Stout never harmed anyone or any property in his escape, Judge Donald believes it is clear that his escape should not be labeled a crime of violence.

To read the full opinion, click here.

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When is a Courthouse Escape a Violent Offense?

Does a criminal’s escape from custody rise to the level of a violent offense? Courts have been struggling to answer that question with any degree of certainty. The latest case to deal with the issue is the Sixth Circuit case United States v. Oaks.

In Oaks, defendant Jerry Ray Oaks had a prior conviction for escape based on an earlier attempt to flee from a courthouse. In a later case, Oaks pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and the district court in the Eastern District of Tennessee sentenced him to 120 months. Oaks appealed his sentence, challenging the district court’s use of his prior conviction for felony escape to support his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

The Court stated that Oaks made his escape from a courtroom which was not in a secure facility. The Court labeled his escape as one from “nonsecure custody.” The Court was tasked with deciding whether such an escape from “nonsecure custody” is a “violent felony” for sentencing purposes.

To answer such a question the Court must decide whether an offender is significantly more likely than others to attack, or physically to resist, an apprehender, thereby producing a “serious potential risk of physical injury.” Chambers vs. United States, 555 U.S. at 128-29 (2009). The Court found that in this case, as in Chambers, “a United States Sentencing Commission report helps provide a conclusive, negative answer.” 

The Court decided that the act of escape from “nonsecure custody” is rarely violent. The Court relied on statistics that showed that out of one hundred seventy-seven instances of escape from “nonsecure custody” in 2006 and 2007, only 1.7% ever resulted in injury. The Court went on to say that a felony is not necessarily violent just because past commissions of that felony have involved violence. By way of example, the Court pointed to Chambers where the Supreme Court found that “failing to report” is not a violent felony even though previous commissions of that crime were known to have involved violence. 

The Court ultimately held that an escape from “nonsecure custody” is not a violent felony for sentencing purposes. They were careful to say that some courtrooms may be part of secure facilities and an escape from them may amount to an escape from “secure custody” thus necessitating a different decision. The Court remanded the case for resentencing.

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