Sixth Circuit Hears Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Appeal From Lillelid Murderer

The recently decided Sixth Circuit case of Howell v. Hodge began in 1997 when Karen Howell and five of her friends set off from Pikeville, Kentucky to New Orleans. At the time, Howell was only 17-years-old, another of the group was 14 and the rest were over 18. The group of friends brought two guns with them on their journey and discussed forcibly trading in their broken down car for a newer one along the way.

While stopped in Greeneville, Tennessee, an opportunity to steal a better car presented itself. A Jehovah’s Witness, Vidar Lillelid, came up to Howell and her friends and began to share his religious views. One of Howell’s compatriots brandished a gun and walked Lillelid back to his family’s van despite Mr. Lillelid’s offer of his wallet and his keys. The group ended up ordering Lillelid to pull over on a secluded stretch of road, at which point, all four members of the family were shot multiple times. The only person to survive was the Lillelid’s two-year-old son who lost an eye in the attack.

Howell and her group attempted to flee to Mexico but were caught in Arizona after failing to cross the border. Howell and her friends still had several of the Lillelid’s possessions when they were apprehended.

Prosecutors in Tennessee then filed charges and initially sought the death penalty. In exchange for dropping the death penalty charges, the group pled guilty to the crime, with Howell and the other minor pleading guilty in adult court. Howell was eventually sentenced to three life sentences to be served consecutively without the possibility of parole.

Howell then filed a petition for relief, claiming that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. She said that her attorney at the time should have insisted that she take a psychological evaluation to determine if her mental state required that she be committed to a psychiatric institution, which would have prevented her being transferred to adult court. The case made its way to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which found that although the attorney had indeed been deficient, Howell was not able to show prejudice.

The Sixth Circuit agreed to hear the case and laid out that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a claimant must show that deficient performance resulted in prejudice. The Sixth Circuit agreed with lower courts that there were reasonable grounds to believe Howell was not “committable” at the time of her trial. Thus, her attorney’s lack of action to get her a psychological evaluation does not prove prejudice. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit says that for a claimant to make such an ineffective assistance claim, he or she must establish that, but for their counsel’s ineffectiveness, he or she would not have pled guilty and would instead have gone to trial. Howell never says that, just that she might have been committed to an institution for a brief period of time for evaluation.

The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed the conviction and the ruling of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Court found that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel is a demanding one that requires claimants prove that the likelihood of a different result is substantial, not just conceivable.

To read the full opinion, click here.

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By Lee Davis

CCA Judge Thomas Dissent on failure to advise state of defendant's acceptance of plea

In State v. Pye, Judge Kelly Thomas disagrees "with the majority’s conclusion that trial counsel’s actions regarding the Petitioner’s acceptance of the plea agreement did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. With respect to the Petitioner’s remaining issue, I concur with the majority’s decision."

As a general rule, “defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” Missouri v. Frye, --- U.S. ---, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). By allowing a plea agreement offer “to expire without advising the defendant or allowing him to consider it,” defense counsel renders constitutionally ineffective assistance to the defendant. Id. The converse had also been held to be true, “that defense counsel does have a duty to communicate an accepted plea to the State in a timely manner, i.e., before the plea offer expires.” Randle v. State, 847 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that the defendant likely had a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel where his defense counsel failed to accept a plea offer as instructed, allowing the offer to lapse); cf. Nichols v. State, 683 S.E.2d 610, 613 (Ga. 2009) (concluding that defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to communicate the defendant’s decision to accept a plea agreement where defendant did not make decision until after the offer had lapsed). To hold otherwise would mean that defense counsel’s duty to communicate plea offers to the defendant “would have no point if the duty to communicate the acceptance of the plea offer to the State is not also in place.”

TN Supreme Court Examines the Constitutionality of Two Murder Convictions and the Subsequent Death Sentence

• Leonard Edward Smith v. State of Tennessee

The TN Supreme Court recently decided the case of Leonard Smith, convicted murderer on death row. The long case with a complicated procedural history began in 1985. He was convicted of murdering John Pierce in 1985 and of murdering Novella Webb in 1989, both occurring in the process of an armed robbery.

There were four issues on appeal. The first, and arguably the most interesting, is whether Smith was denied his Constitutional right to a fair trial at his 1995 re-sentencing hearing when his counsel failed to investigate and present evidence in support of his motion to recuse the presiding judge. Judge Brown, presiding judge over Smith's case, also served as a Prosecutor in Carter County. In May of 1984, Smith was indicted in Carter County for simple robbery and DUI. Prosecutor Brown (now Judge Brown) was assigned to prosecute him. Therefore, Smith was being prosecuted at the same time in two different counties for four crimes: the two murders and the robbery and DUI in Carter County. Smith appealed his convictions for the simple robbery and DUI but was denied relief. Meanwhile, Prosecutor Brown later became Judge Brown and presided over Smith's 1995 re-sentencing hearing.

When presented with these facts, Smith's attorneys neglected to investigate further into Judge Brown's involvement in the prior convictions to determine whether he had an obligation to recuse himself.

In determining whether Smith's counsel was ineffective, the Court looked to the United State Supreme Court's holding in Strickland v. Washington. Specifically, the Court in Strickland stated that the ultimate focus on the effectiveness of an attorney is "whether counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Judicial impartiality is a fundamental requirement in the guarantee for due process. Therefore, the test is an objective one: the Court examines whether the Judge is likely to be "neutral" or whether there is an unconstitutional "potential for bias."

The Court held that Smith's counsel were ineffective when they neglected to investigate or further pursue the motion to recuse. This ineffective counsel resulted in prejudice to Smith in that he was denied his right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. Particularly damaging to Smith's case was Judge Brown's involvement in the re-sentencing. As part of justification for a sentence of death, a judge should consider any aggravating factors such as prior violent felony convictions. Not only did Judge Brown know of the prior conviction for robbery, but he was the attorney that prosecuted Smith for that crime. This is clearly a situation that would point to a "potential for bias" by the Judge.

The Court examined three other issues: 1) whether Smith met the definition for "intellectual disability" and would thus be precluded from receiving a death sentence; 2) whether Smith's counsel were ineffective in their voir dire of potential jurors when they neglected to ask the jurors if they or someone close to them had been victims of a crime; and 3) whether the post-conviction claims Smith brought for the Pierce murder were barred by the statute of limitations.

The Court decided the lower courts should be given the opportunity to further examine whether Smith met the definition of "intellectual disability." The case was remanded back to sentencing. If found to have an "intellectual disability," Smith cannot be sentenced to death. Next, the Court decided that his attorneys were ineffective when they neglected to ask the potential jurors if they or anyone close to them had been a victim of a crime. The boyfriend of the daughter of one of the jurors was murdered in the recent years before Smith's trial. When asked if that would impair his ability to be impartial, the juror responded that he could remain impartial throughout his decision. Although counsel was ineffective, since Smith could not prove actual bias, he could not be afforded a remedy. Lastly, the court held that Smith's post-conviction claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for bringing post-conviction claims is three years from the final action of the highest appellate court. Smith waited twelve years to bring post-conviction claims for the Pierce murder. The Court held this was obviously in violation of the statute of limitations and the claims were barred.

After all of that it might be difficult to tell where exactly Smith stands. Here is the rundown:

• Smith's conviction for the Pierce murder are affirmed.
• Smith's conviction for the Webb murder is affirmed.
• Smith's death sentence was vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for hearings on Smith's mental capacity. These hearings are to be conducted by a judge other than Judge Brown.

6th Circuit holds a Sleeping Attorney is Not "Ineffective" Counsel

• Muniz v. Smith

The 6th Circuit heard a case out of Michigan last week that involved a defendant's appeal of a conviction for assault with intent to commit murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and felony firearm. Muniz argued that his 6th Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney fell asleep during his trial.

The 6th Circuit first had to decide which rule of law to follow. Muniz argued that the Court should only apply the rule of U.S. v. Cronic which held that there are "circumstances so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of their effect in a particular case is unjustified and prejudice is presumed." The lower Court previously used the standard of U.S. v. Strickland which held that in order to successfully claim that an attorney was so ineffective as to violate the 6th Amendment, the defendant must prove two things: that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.

Applying both rules, the 6th circuit determined that the defendant had not proven that his counsel's slumber had a prejudicial effect on his defense. Applying the rule from Cronic, the Court had to decide whether Muniz had proven that his attorney slept through a "substantial part" of his trial. The only evidence Muniz offered was testimony from two of the jurors who said they saw the attorney sleeping during Muniz's cross-examination. His cross-examination made up only a very small part of the trial transcript. This evidence, the Court held, did not prove the attorney slept through substantial portion of the trial.

Applying the rule from Strickland, the Court had to decide whether the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and if so, if that conduct prejudiced the defendant. The Court held that there is no question that the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Sleeping in court during your client's cross-examination is not reasonable conduct for an attorney. What the defendant could not prove, however, was that his attorney's conduct prejudiced the defendant's defense. In order to do so, Muniz would have to prove that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The evidence against Muniz was so strong, the Court held that it was unlikely that the outcome of the trial would have been different even if the attorney had not fallen asleep.

If an attorney sleeping through examination of his client by the government is not enough to trigger relief, what is? Sounds like the Court is asleep on this issue as well. I understand that in a case--especially one of strong proof--that the court can't be reversing on collateral issues. But I wonder what the trial court was doing. Surely, if two jurors are to believed and counsel was asleep, the Court was aware. I can't think of anything more damaging to the integrity of the judicial process than a sleeping defense attorney. You can imagine what the jurors said, "if his own lawyer doesn't care enough to be awake for the trial you know he's guilty."

Tennessee Supreme Court says Lawyers must advise Clients of Mandatory Supervision in Sex Cases

Jason Calvert was represented by two lawyers after an indictment in Davidson County on numerous sex offenses. He and his lawyers met at least 6 times. They provided him discovery. They went over the materials with him. After these meetings, he entered a written plea agreement to several offenses, two of which were aggravated sexual battery. Calvert received a sentence of 10 years suspended after he served 9 months in jail. During the plea colloquoy, the Judge believed the sentence was illegal because aggravated sexual battery was non-probatable. After consulting with his lawyers, Calvert changed his plea from two counts of aggravated sexual battery to two counts of rape. Neither his attorney nor the Court advised him that rape carries with it mandatory lifetime supervision.


In revieweing Calvert's post-conviction petition, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a lawyers failure to advise their clients of such an important and adverse consequence such as mandatory lifetime supervision when the client is considering a plea consitututes ineffective assistance of counsel under the 6th Amendment. The Supreme Court further held that because the Defendant testified that he thought it would have made a difference in his decision, that such deficiency constitutes prejudice.


Practice Note: Slow down attorneys. The Court has made it clear that even if your client is considering a plea that carries lifetime supervision, that you must advise of the possible supervision requirements. In Calvert, This issue got past the Judge and both Defense Attorneys who did not mention it. The one person it did not get past was the District Attorney who checked the box on the Judgment form. However, the DA never announced that condition in the plea colloquoy transcript. Had he announced it on the record, how much time could have been saved avoiding a post-conviction hearing and appeal?

• JASON CALVERT v. STATE OF TENNESSEE