Lying to Probation Officer is a Federal Crime

By Lee Davis
United States v. Vreeland

Everyone knows that a person has the right to remain silent when faced with questioning by police and most people understand that you have the right to have an attorney present during questioning. Perhaps fewer people know that it is a crime to lie to federal agents.

In Vreeland, the court was faced with these issues in the context of a man who lied to his probation officer during his monthly probation meeting. Vreeland denied knowing a man involved in a crime. He too was a suspect in this crime. His probation officer pressed on these facts. Vreeland's statements are what formed the basis of both a probation violation and the substantive new crime of lying to the PO--a federal agent. This is a novel issue in the Sixth Circuit.

In Vreeland the Court was face with two questions: whether his false statements to a probation officer during the course of a monthly supervisory meeting are protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and whether such statements fall within the “judicial function exception” to prosecution set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b). The answer to both questions is no.

The Court reasoned that:
We have held that “the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing in the context of a meeting with a probation officer.” United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1326 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant’s voluntary revelation to his probation officer during a presentence meeting that he regularly purchased cocaine to support his habit, resulting in the probation officer’s recalculation of the defendant’s base offense level and sentencing range for his drug offense, was not a compelled incrimination); see also United States v. Humphrey, 34 F.3d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[U]nless a state overtly threatens to revoke probation in retaliation for the legitimate exercise of the self-incrimination privilege, there is no reasonable basis for a probationer to believe that his Fifth Amendment rights are in jeopardy.”) (citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 438).

As to the notion that these are protected communications that are not subject to prosecution, the Court rejected that idea.
A meeting between a probation officer and a defendant under supervision is not a “judicial proceeding” protected by § 1001(b) because it serves an administrative, not an adjudicative, function.

Vreeland received a two year sentence for lying to his PO and an additional two years for his probation violation.

The full opinion can be found here.

There is a Gradual Erosion by the Supreme Court to Law Supporting Miranda Warnings

The United States Supreme Court has, over the last two years, re-examined the iconic Miranda warnings. There have been three notable cases decided recently that impose limitations on Miranda and lead many to question the warnings sustainability.

Powell v. Florida and Maryland v. Shatzer were decided within one day of each other. Powell held that the statement "You have the right to a lawyer before answering any questions and you may invoke that right at any time" was an adequate warning under Miranda even though the officers did not explain that the suspect had a right to a lawyer during interrogation.

Maryland v. Shatzer answered the question of whether a detained suspect who has asked to speak with an attorney can ever be questioned again without a lawyer present. The Court held that law enforcement could resume interrogation if 14 days have passed since the suspect last expressed a desire to have a lawyer present and the suspect has waived his right to an attorney for the current interrogation.

The third case, Berghuis v. Thompson, held that a suspect must unambiguously state he wishes to remain silent. Silence in the midst of questioning is not an adequate invocation of the right to remain silent. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court's ruling imposes a counter intuitive requirement on suspects: a person must speak in order to invoke their right to remain silent. Try to reason your way to that conclusion.

While the Miranda warnings are still intact, many feel that the Court is gradually chipping away that the warnings piece by piece. The question is whether the Court will one day see fit to overrule Miranda or just continue to impose limitations upon it. At any rate, as of today a person can no longer remain mute and enjoy the protections that Miranda once afforfded.

Supreme Court Holds State's Do Not Waive Sovereign Immunity For Inmate Claim Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act




• SOSSAMON v. TEXAS

Sossamon, a Texas prisoner, sued Texas and prison officials, seeking injunctive and money damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act for Texas prison policies that prevented inmates from attending religious services while on cell restriction for disciplinary infractions and that barred use of the prison chapel for religious worship for these same disciplinary reasons.

The Supreme Court today rejected Sossamon's claim by affirming a lower court decision to allow summary judgement.

The Supreme Court held that in accepting federal funding, neither Texas nor any state consents to waive a state's sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.

No Error Found In Denying Defendant's Request To Show Scar To Jury At Close Range, CCA Says.

• STATE v. NAPOLEON STEPHAN MEREDIT

In this appeal to the CCA Napolean Meredit asks whether the trial court erred in failing to allow the appellant to be viewed from a close distance by the jury and in doing so whether that error forced him to relinquish his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. The Court found no error on appeal.


This was a robbery trial and identity was an issue.  At trial, defense counsel asked that Meredit be allowed to stand “a foot or two” in front of the jury so they could see that he had a distinctive scar on his forehead which was never mentioned by the victims, calling their identification of Meredit as the perpetrator into question. After the trial court denied the request, counselasked that the jury be allowed to come to the front table to see Meredit. When that request was also denied, counsel asked that the Meredit’s face be displayed on a projection screen for the jury. The court refused, stating that the court did not possess the necessary equipment. Finally, counsel asked that the photographs he took of Meredit the previous afternoon be admitted but stated that he might have to testify in order to get the photographs admitted as an exhibit. The court advised that Meredit could put on the desired proof in other ways, such as by standing “in the well”; by having a witness, such as a friend or family member, testify regarding the scar; or by having Meredit testify about his scar. Meredit ultimately chose to testify. On appeal, Meredit argues that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to get close to the jury, thereby infringing upon his right to present a defense, and that the error forced him to relinquish his right not to testify, violating his Fifth Amendment rights.


In upholding the trial Court's decision, the court followed existing precedent:  “[t]he determination to allow the display of body parts and physical traits to the jury is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. David Lee Richards, No. 03C01-9207-CR-230, 1993 WL 80536, at *3 (Tenn. Crim.
App. at Knoxville, Mar. 23, 1993). 


No Fifth Amendment protections are implicated here where Meredit felt compelled to testify by a previous court ruling. His choice was still free and voluntary.