Showing posts with label statute of limitations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label statute of limitations. Show all posts

Thursday, November 22, 2012

U.S. Supreme Court to consider "late" actual innocence proof


An issue before the U.S. Supreme Court involves the late appearance of evidence that may demonstrate a criminal defendant’s innocence. Though many people assume that if evidence were to arise showing that someone was clearly innocent of the crime they were accused of committing, no matter how late, then it would be considered by the court. Perhaps it may come as a surprise to some, this is not always the case. Here is the petition for certiorari granted by the Supreme Court on this issue filed by Floyd Perkins.

The actual issue presented states: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) contains a one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition. In Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010), the Supreme Court affirmed that a habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of that one-year period “only if he shows: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.

Floyd Perkins' petition presents two recurring questions of jurisprudential significance involving equitable tolling under AEDPA that have divided the circuits:
1. Whether there is an actual-innocence exception to the requirement that a petitioner show an extraordinary circumstance that “prevented timely filing” of a habeas petition.
2. If so, whether there is an additional actual- innocence exception to the requirement that a petitioner demonstrate that “he has been pursuing his rights diligently.

As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in 2009, the Supreme Court has never held that “the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”

The Supreme Court now has agreed to hear a case that demonstrates exactly why the issue can be a tricky one. The case involves a Michigan man, Floyd Perkins, who is serving a life sentence for murder. New evidence was uncovered and a long time passed before it was presented. The issue now is whether it can be raised or whether Perkins should spend the rest of his life in prison for a crime he says he did not commit.

The details of the incident begin with a house party in 1993. Perkins was in attendance and left with two other men, one of whom was later found dead in the woods, having been stabbed in the head. The third man, Jones, testified that Perkins murdered him. Perkins said he parted ways with the other two and later ran across his accuser under a streetlight covered in blood. The jury ultimately believed the accuser, voting to convict Perkins.
After his conviction Perkins worked to collect evidence demonstrating his innocence. There was an affidavit from his sister that said she heard secondhand that Jones had bragged about the killing and had taken bloody clothes to a drycleaner. This is hearsay and it is from a relative, both facts undermined the value of the testimony. A few years later Perkins got a second sworn statement from an acquaintance of Jones’ who said Jones confessed to the killing and confirmed the story about the dry cleaning. Then, a few years after that an employee of the dry cleaning store said that a man who looked like Jones had indeed come in to drop off bloody pants to be cleaned.

Finally, with this information gathered, Perkins asked a federal court to throw out his conviction in 2008. Magistrate Judge Timothy P. Greeley of the Federal District Court in Marquette, Michigan recommended that his request be denied because it was filed too late. Perkins appealed but to no avail. Then the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling. It ordered Judge Bell of the Federal District Court in Grand Rapids to consider whether the new evidence was credible enough to justify consideration.

After the Sixth Circuit decision, Michigan appealed to the Supreme Court, and with the support of 10 other states, argued that deadlines are important procedural rules and ought to be enforced as written. They say the legal requirement is that such claims be pursued diligently.

However, Perkins argues that’s exactly what he did. He filed a note with the lower court before the deadline passed explaining that many of his documents and property had been destroyed by prison personnel following a skirmish. He was subsequently denied access to the law library and placed in solitary confinement for nearly five years, making further work on his case all but impossible.

Though the evidence is suggestive, it’s not factually conclusive for Perkins. Had it been presented at trial it may have made a difference, or maybe not. The question is whether there is enough reason to justify Perkins presenting it to a court for consideration now.

Read: “Case Asks When New Evidence Means a New Trial,” by Adam Liptak, published at NYTimes.com.

Monday, June 4, 2012

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals: No recovery for man released from prison 17 years too late



On Tuesday the Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals refused to reinstate the lawsuit of a man, Buxton Craig Heyerman, who blames prosecutors for leaving him in prison for 17 years after his conviction was overturned. Heyerman filed a civil rights action alleging the defendants violated his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights through his lengthy detention. 

There seems to be no dispute that a court order overturning Buxton Heyerman’s conviction and ordering a new trial apparently fell through the cracks in 1989. In January of 1988, after initially being found guilty of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, he was sentenced to a prison term of 20-40 years. The next year the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the matter back to the trial court. But instead of getting a new trial, he stayed in prison.

The Sixth Circuit said there’s no evidence that his extended stay in prison was due to a prosecutor's bad policy or a failure to supervise staff, key points in his civil rights lawsuit. The system in place at the time was to notify the parties and schedule a status conference once a case was remanded or reconsideration. For reasons unknown, the procedure was not followed in this case. 


The Sixth Circuit wrote that: 

“The judicial system - to say nothing of the criminal defense system - has not functioned as it should when a criminal defendant remains imprisoned for 17 years after his or her conviction has been reversed and no further action has been taken. Liability, however, does not necessarily attach to any entity and/or individual as a result of this breakdown.”

Heyerman’s attorney at the time was evidently aware of the decision but told his client to keep quiet and stay locked up for a few more years until the statute of limitations on the charge ran out. Calhoun County authorities said they became aware of the case only in 2007, when Heyerman filed a lawsuit demanding his release.

A judge that year dismissed charges, saying Heyerman's right to a speedy trial was violated. Heyerman’s former attorney paid $95,000 to settle a malpractice claim and was suspended from the practice of law for three years.

The judges of the Sixth Circuit summed the trial up aptly, calling it a “remarkable saga.”“It is not often that an inmate seeks refuge from the prosecutorial arm of the state by laying low for 17 years in prison in order to avoid the risk of a new trial that, if all goes badly, will lead to incarceration. And it is not often that a state abets this strategy by failing to realize that it is housing an individual whose conviction has been reversed.

To read the full opinion, click here

Earlier:

Monday, March 14, 2011

Post Conviction Tolls One Year Statute of Limitations for Federal Habeas Claims, says the Supreme Court


Wall v. Kholi is a 9-0 decision where the Supreme Court held that “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim” tolls the 1-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition.  All the Justices agreed but Scalia filed a concurring opinion with an argumentative footnote.


Justice Alito writing for the court said that a Rhode Island post conviction petition amounted to collateral review. The court said: "We hold that the phrase collateral review in §2244(d)(2) means judicial review of a judgment  in a proceeding that is not part of direct review. Because the parties agree that a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law is not part of the direct review process, we hold that respondent’s motion tolled the AEDPA limitation period and that his federal habeas petition was therefore timely."


Kholi"s conviction became final on direct review when his time expired for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Previous to that date, he filed a motion to reduce sentence under Rule 35 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  While his Rule 35 motion was pending, Kholi also filed an application for state postconviction relief. The trial court denied this motion and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed that decision.


Kholi filed a federal habeas petition in the District of Rhode Island on September 5, 2007. By that time, his conviction had been final for over 11 years. AEDPA generally requires a federal habeas petition to be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review. But the 1-year limitation period is tolled during the time of “a properly filed application for State  post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” 


In order for Kholi’s petition to be timely, his Rule 35 motion to reduce sentence had to be found to trigger the tolling provision. And, that is what the Supreme Court found that it did. Previous to this decision the Courts of Appeals were divided over the question whether a motion to reduce sentence tolls the period of limitation. The Court granted certiorari to answer this question concerning a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law. The Court said: "We thus hold that a  motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law is an application for “collateral review” that triggers AEDPA’s tolling provision."