Interesting Sixth Circuit Opinion regarding Miranda Rights And Public Safety Exception

An interesting opinion, especially in light of the recent Boston Marathon bombing and subsequent arrest, is the Sixth Circuit case of U.S. v. Hodge. In Hodge, a suspect’s home was raided by police and a bomb was discovered after the suspect divulged its existence during questioning by police that took place without reading the suspect his Miranda rights. The issue before the court was whether evidence of the bomb gleaned from his statements to police should be suppressed. The Sixth Circuit held: no, it should not, that the questioning was valid due to the public safety exception to Miranda.

The case began when an informant approached police in Calhoun County, Michigan to say that an acquaintance, Lonnie Hodge, was using a one pot meth making method known as “shake and bake.” The method requires combining the ingredients of methamphetamine into a single bottle and shaking it until the drug is properly formed. The informant further said that Hodge had a pipe bomb and a black rifle that he suspected was an AK-47.

The police investigated Hodge by going through the list of pseudoephedrine purchasers and coordinating with neighboring police departments who were also investigating the man. After gathering sufficient evidence, the police were able to obtain a search warrant for Hodge’s home.

When police arrived things did not begin well. They knocked down the door to be greeted by a 6-foot 6, 320-pound Hodge waiving a screwdriver and screaming incoherently. Eventually Hodge was subdued and removed from the premises for questioning. A few minutes later, once Hodge calmed down, an officer asked whether Hodge he had anything in his house such as a meth lab or a pipe bomb that could hurt officers. Hodge said no. A few minutes later Hodge said that there was a bomb in the house. The police then pressed him for more information and he admitted that there was a pipe bomb, giving the location of the device that was eventually disarmed by the bomb expert. A subsequent search of the house uncovered drugs, though not meth, and a black rifle.

Hodge asked the trial court to suppress evidence of the pipe bomb, saying that the officer’s failure to read him his Miranda rights meant that the fruits of the interrogation should be inadmissible in court. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the bomb should be admitted given the pubic safety exception established by the Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles as well as the inevitable discovery doctrine.

The Sixth Circuit said that in some cases “overriding considerations of public safety” can permit officers to omit reading a suspect his or her Miranda rights before questioning. The Court held that because bombs, especially pipe bombs, are by their very nature unstable and could explode at any time, they posed a real and present danger to all the officers at Hodge’s house.

Additionally, the Sixth Circuit wrote that even if a Miranda violation had occurred, the pipe bomb would still not be suppressed due to the inevitable discovery doctrine. This is because the police had a valid warrant to search the home and, given the bomb’s location, would have eventually discovered it even without Hodge warning them in advance.

To read the full opinion, click here.

The Supreme Court: Inmate not in custody for Miranda purposes

In 1966, the Supreme Court in the case of Miranda v. Arizona attempted to create explicit warnings that would remind suspects of their constitutional rights before police interrogation -   specifically, the rights under the 5^th and 6^th amendments to remain silent and to have an attorney during a criminal proceeding.  These “Miranda rights” are now ubiquitous in popular culture, and anyone who has ever watched any of the myriad of crime/lawyer dramas has heard them recited.  What has not been as clear is exactly when the police are required to recite the warnings.  The uncertainty surrounding Miranda was on display most recently in the Supreme Court case Howes v. Fields.

            The trigger for the Miranda warnings is that there are required before a “custodial interrogation” can begin.  At first glance, it would seem clear that a prisoner in jail is in “custody”.  However, in a 6-3 decision, the Court held in Howes v. Fields, that jailhouse questioning does not automatically require Miranda warnings.  While already serving a jail sentence in a Michigan jail, the defendant in the case was removed from his cell and questioned by two armed sheriff’s deputies about another crime for 5 to 7 hours. The questioning began in the evening at some point between 7:00 and 9:00.  Testimony during the trial claimed that during the questioning he stated he no longer wanted to talk but never explicitly asked to return to his cell.  At no time was he read Miranda warnings. 

            Despite these facts, the Court rejected a categorical rule that requires Miranda warnings be given to a suspect who is currently serving a jail sentence.  Instead, they made clear that a determination of “custody” for Miranda purposes should include an inquiry into all of the circumstances.  In Howes, the majority made much of the fact that the defendant was told multiple times that he could leave and return to his cell whenever he wanted.  They also noted that he was offered food and water and was not restrained during the questioning. 

            The dissenting opinion argued that the inquiry should have focused on the overwhelming nature of the “police-dominated atmosphere”.  In many ways such an approach harkens back to the original Miranda decision where the Court sought to clearly limit overreaching by the police who at times utilized brutal interrogation tactics.  The dissent also is clearly concerned that the holding in the case could be read to limit the requirement of Miranda warnings for suspects in jail. 

This decision will cause further anxiety amongst court observers who already fear that the Court is moving towards a repeal of Miranda.  Whatever your opinion, it certainly is surprising to hear the Supreme Court rule that jail inmates are not in “custody”.

** The full opinion can be read here **

TN Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses Evidence Tampering Conviction

• State of Tennessee v. Ashlee N. Appleton

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals decided the case of Ashlee Appleton last week. A jury convicted Appleton of tampering with evidence. The case centers around a murder that occurred on September 8, 2009. There are no accusations that Appleton had any involvement in the murder itself; however, Appleton was charged with tampering with evidence because she admitted to disposing of the gun that was used to commit the murder.

According to Appleton's written confession, given voluntarily after being advised of her Miranda rights, Appleton was at the house with a bunch of her friends. While she was standing in the yard of the house, she heard a pop that sounded like a firework from the other side of the house. She immediately got in her car with some of her friends and drove off. Amidst her journey back to Chattanooga, Jeresse Edwards, the accused shooter, informed Appleton that he had the gun in her car. Wanting to get the gun out of her car, Appelton said she threw the gun off a bridge around the Nickajack Dam.

The State relied on this evidence at trial. Once Appleton was convicted, she appealed to this Court arguing that the State did not satisfy their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that she tampered with the evidence.

The Court of Appeals agreed. The standard used by the Court was "corpus delicti", which means the "body of the crime." In order to obtain a conviction, the State must prove the corpus delicti of tampering with evidence. Two elements are required to prove the corpus delicti: first, that a certain result has been produced, and, second, that the result was created through criminal agency. Because of this standard, the Court reasoned, when a Defendant confesses to a certain crime, some corroborating evidence is required to establish the corpus delicti of the offense charged. The problem with the State's case, the Court held, was that they did not produce enough corroborating evidence to prove that Appleton tampered with the evidence. Specifically, the defendant never admitted to knowing that a gun had been fired, or that anyone had been killed. Further, investigators never found the gun, and the State did not produce any evidence that the Defendant had knowledge that the gun had been used in a crime. Without this corroborating evidence, the Court held, the conviction must be reversed.

There is a Gradual Erosion by the Supreme Court to Law Supporting Miranda Warnings

The United States Supreme Court has, over the last two years, re-examined the iconic Miranda warnings. There have been three notable cases decided recently that impose limitations on Miranda and lead many to question the warnings sustainability.

Powell v. Florida and Maryland v. Shatzer were decided within one day of each other. Powell held that the statement "You have the right to a lawyer before answering any questions and you may invoke that right at any time" was an adequate warning under Miranda even though the officers did not explain that the suspect had a right to a lawyer during interrogation.

Maryland v. Shatzer answered the question of whether a detained suspect who has asked to speak with an attorney can ever be questioned again without a lawyer present. The Court held that law enforcement could resume interrogation if 14 days have passed since the suspect last expressed a desire to have a lawyer present and the suspect has waived his right to an attorney for the current interrogation.

The third case, Berghuis v. Thompson, held that a suspect must unambiguously state he wishes to remain silent. Silence in the midst of questioning is not an adequate invocation of the right to remain silent. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court's ruling imposes a counter intuitive requirement on suspects: a person must speak in order to invoke their right to remain silent. Try to reason your way to that conclusion.

While the Miranda warnings are still intact, many feel that the Court is gradually chipping away that the warnings piece by piece. The question is whether the Court will one day see fit to overrule Miranda or just continue to impose limitations upon it. At any rate, as of today a person can no longer remain mute and enjoy the protections that Miranda once afforfded.

Should A 13 Year Old Child Be Given Miranda Warnings When Questioned By Police At School? Supreme Court Oral Arguments JDB v. NC.

On Wednesday, March 23rd, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in

• J.D.B. V. North Carolina.

The transcript of yesterday's oral argument makes interesting reading as the Supreme Court takes on the question:  Should a 13 year old be given Miranda warnings when questioned by Police at School?

Barbara Blackman attorney for the NC minor begins powerfully by stating:
J.D.B. was only 13 years old when he was taken out of his middle school classroom and escorted to a closed door interrogation conducted by outside law enforcement regarding a matter that did not take place on school property. He was isolated from his family who had already demonstrated an interest in this investigation and sought to shield him from the police. He was not advised that he was free to leave or free not to answer questions until he had already incriminated himself. The restrictions on J.D.B.'s freedom of movement which existed because of his youth were heightened by the manner in which this officer chose to conduct this interrogation.


As we all know, criminal suspects are typically given Miranda warnings if they are questioned while in police custody. A person is usually considered to be in custody if a reasonable person in similar circumstances would believe that he was not free to leave. The question presented here is whether courts should consider the age of a juvenile suspect in deciding whether he is in custody for Miranda purposes.


JUSTICE BREYER:... in considering a reasonable person for this purpose and avoiding subjective states of mind, you would look at objective circumstances, known to both the officer and the suspect that are likely relevant to the way a person would understand his situation?


JUSTICE BREYER:  So both would be both mental illness and age and -- I don't know, whether you speak English, and a lot of other things would be relevant, provided they are things that are relevant to how a person would understand his situation and are known to both the officer and the individual?


MS. BLACKMAN:  Well, we're simply making the point that there's not necessarily going to be a floodgate opening.


JUSTICE BREYER:  No, no, but I mean what Justice Scalia was really asking is, do you favor something like this test that I read, which is open as to circumstance?  Anything could fit in that blank, as long as both policemen and the -- and the individual know it and it is relevant as to how he understands the circumstance, whether he's likely free to go or not.


MS. BLACKMAN:  Conceptually absolutely.

JUSTICE SCALIA:  Even -- even if you said no, you're pushing us there, because there's no basis for treating a childhood any differently from these other factors. So basically you're saying Justice Breyer would call it objective circumstances. You know, whether you're mentally deficient, I would call that the subjective condition of the -- of the person being held in custody.  And I think, I don't think that's what we meant by the phrase "objective circumstances."But you want objective circumstances to include the character of the person being held in custody, whether he's mentally deficient, whether he's schizophrenic, known to the police, you know, whatever factors, right? Those are all objective circumstances?


MS. BLACKMAN:  Your Honor, what we are talking about are a complex of characteristics which are unique to children, and that's what we are examining in this case.


JUSTICE GINSBURG:  Ms. Blackman, what is complex about a juvenile investigator?  That's what this police officer was.  So he's investigating a juvenile for juvenile justice purposes, and I think there's hardly anything more objective than that.  This case has child written all over it.  It's investigator who deals with children.  The first proceedings is going to be a 
juvenile proceeding.



JUSTICE KAGAN:  Do we need either imaginative powers or empirical data to know that when a 13-year-old is brought into a room in his school, taken 
out of class, four people are there, two are police officers, one is assistant principal, threatened with custody, that that person is not going to feel free to 
take off and leave?


And, the attorney general representing North Carolina got similar treatment by the court.


JUSTICE BREYER:  There's a big sign jail cell, the door is unlocked.  When you want to leave, leave.  Is he in custody?


MR. COOPER:  Well, Your Honor, I think you have to look at the obvious circumstances.

JUSTICE BREYER:  Is he in custody?  It's a jail cell, but a big sign, "Go ahead, leave, go when you want."  Is he free to leave?

MR. COOPER:  I think he may be, Your Honor.

JUSTICE BREYER:  Yeah, so do I.

JUSTICE BREYER:  Okay.  Then why aren't you willing to take into account an ambiguous situation as was true in Alvarado, a tough situation where it's 
pretty unclear; he was brought there by his parents and there are all these things around that might suggest to a 20-year-old, yeah, you could leave, but to a 12-year-old, "no."  If the judge can take into account whether he's in a wheelchair, whether he just speaks Ukrainian, whether in fact a thing -- you have to swim through a pool and he doesn't know how to swim -- I mean, all kinds of things like that; why can't he take into account in a proper situation before he thinks he's in custody or not, things they both know including 
whether he's 8 years old or 22?


MR. COOPER:  Your Honor, because those are obvious circumstances that everyone agrees -­


JUSTICE BREYER:  And it's obvious whether 

MR. COOPER:  The problem is, Your Honor, you have to think like an 8-year-old or think like a 15-year-old in order to determine the situation.

The final word is still to come.

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