U.S. Supreme Court to consider "late" actual innocence proof

An issue before the U.S. Supreme Court involves the late appearance of evidence that may demonstrate a criminal defendant’s innocence. Though many people assume that if evidence were to arise showing that someone was clearly innocent of the crime they were accused of committing, no matter how late, then it would be considered by the court. Perhaps it may come as a surprise to some, this is not always the case. Here is the petition for certiorari granted by the Supreme Court on this issue filed by Floyd Perkins.

The actual issue presented states: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) contains a one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition. In Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010), the Supreme Court affirmed that a habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of that one-year period “only if he shows: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.

Floyd Perkins' petition presents two recurring questions of jurisprudential significance involving equitable tolling under AEDPA that have divided the circuits:
1. Whether there is an actual-innocence exception to the requirement that a petitioner show an extraordinary circumstance that “prevented timely filing” of a habeas petition.
2. If so, whether there is an additional actual- innocence exception to the requirement that a petitioner demonstrate that “he has been pursuing his rights diligently.

As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in 2009, the Supreme Court has never held that “the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”

The Supreme Court now has agreed to hear a case that demonstrates exactly why the issue can be a tricky one. The case involves a Michigan man, Floyd Perkins, who is serving a life sentence for murder. New evidence was uncovered and a long time passed before it was presented. The issue now is whether it can be raised or whether Perkins should spend the rest of his life in prison for a crime he says he did not commit.

The details of the incident begin with a house party in 1993. Perkins was in attendance and left with two other men, one of whom was later found dead in the woods, having been stabbed in the head. The third man, Jones, testified that Perkins murdered him. Perkins said he parted ways with the other two and later ran across his accuser under a streetlight covered in blood. The jury ultimately believed the accuser, voting to convict Perkins.
After his conviction Perkins worked to collect evidence demonstrating his innocence. There was an affidavit from his sister that said she heard secondhand that Jones had bragged about the killing and had taken bloody clothes to a drycleaner. This is hearsay and it is from a relative, both facts undermined the value of the testimony. A few years later Perkins got a second sworn statement from an acquaintance of Jones’ who said Jones confessed to the killing and confirmed the story about the dry cleaning. Then, a few years after that an employee of the dry cleaning store said that a man who looked like Jones had indeed come in to drop off bloody pants to be cleaned.

Finally, with this information gathered, Perkins asked a federal court to throw out his conviction in 2008. Magistrate Judge Timothy P. Greeley of the Federal District Court in Marquette, Michigan recommended that his request be denied because it was filed too late. Perkins appealed but to no avail. Then the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling. It ordered Judge Bell of the Federal District Court in Grand Rapids to consider whether the new evidence was credible enough to justify consideration.

After the Sixth Circuit decision, Michigan appealed to the Supreme Court, and with the support of 10 other states, argued that deadlines are important procedural rules and ought to be enforced as written. They say the legal requirement is that such claims be pursued diligently.

However, Perkins argues that’s exactly what he did. He filed a note with the lower court before the deadline passed explaining that many of his documents and property had been destroyed by prison personnel following a skirmish. He was subsequently denied access to the law library and placed in solitary confinement for nearly five years, making further work on his case all but impossible.

Though the evidence is suggestive, it’s not factually conclusive for Perkins. Had it been presented at trial it may have made a difference, or maybe not. The question is whether there is enough reason to justify Perkins presenting it to a court for consideration now.

Read: “Case Asks When New Evidence Means a New Trial,” by Adam Liptak, published at NYTimes.com.

Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses Child Rape Conviction Due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A Tennessee defendant, Joel Ernest Blanton, was convicted of one count of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to 24 years in prison. Blanton appealed the conviction, citing several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to obtain visitor logs from the Tennessee Department of Correction that could have been used to impeach the primary witness against him. The Court of Criminal Appeals heard the case and in an unusual decision, ultimately agreed with Blanton, reversing and remanding his case for a new trial.

By way of background, a 12-year-old girl said that Blanton was a friend of her family whom she had known for years. After having to spend the night at his house one day she says she awoke to find Blanton fondling her until she told him to stop and said that “it hurt.” The defendant remained in bed with the girl until the morning when he told her to be quiet about the incident. The girl’s sisters also later admitted to their mother that they too had inappropriate contact with Blanton after Blanton had crawled into bed with them on a previous occasion that same weekend.

Blanton, who was 20 year old at the time of the incident, always vehemently denied touching the girls, though he did admit that they were in the same house on the night in question.

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the case turned solely on the issue of the witnesses’ credibility. One of the victims testified that her mother was snowed in overnight while visiting their father in prison. On cross-examination, the girl said she was “certain” her mother was away. However, in the videotaped interview with DCS, she said that her mother was at home when the incidents occurred. The other two victims testified that their mother was away from home on the night in question. The mother also said that she was away at the time of the incident. The Court said that whether the mother was home during the alleged incidents was a pivotal fact used by the children and their mother in establishing the time frame relied upon by the State.

The Court of Criminal Appeals found that this case turned completely on the credibility of the State’s witnesses versus the defendant’s witnesses. The evidence of prison visitation records would have irrefutably impeached the mother and her daughter’s credibility regarding where the mother purported to be the night of the incident.

Because the conviction in this case rested solely on the credibility of witnesses, defendant’s counsel should have obtained the available impeachment evidence for use at trial. The Court could not clearly say that the attorney’s failure to do so did not affect the outcome. Given that, Blanton suffered prejudice as a result of his attorney’s failure to request the prison visitation logs.

To read the full opinion, click here.
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The Tennessee Supreme Court on Passing Worthless Checks

By Stevie Phillips

Justice Janice M. Holder, in a unanimous decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court, held yesterday that the misdemeanor "crime of passing worthless checks involves an element of dishonesty or false statement" and can therefore be used to impeach a defendant's credibility so long as its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

Under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), a witness may be impeached with a prior conviction if the crime involves dishonesty or false statement.   Here, the defendant, Wanda F. Russell, argued that an honest mistake can result in a conviction for passing a worthless check.

In determining whether a crime qualifies, a court assesses the elements of the offense, not the circumstances surrounding its commission. Here, the Court applied the rules of statutory construction to the statute setting out the crime of passing worthless checks, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-121(a)(1). The Court concluded that the statute only criminalizes dishonest conduct, not honest mistakes.

Read the full opinion here.

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The CCA, Tenn. R. Evid. 803(26), and Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence

By Stevie Phillips

In State v. Ackerman, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals addressed Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26), a hearsay exception adopted in 2009 that allows admission of some prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. 

The Rule states that the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule:

A statement otherwise admissible under Rule 613(b) if all of the following conditions are satisfied:      

(A) The declarant must testify at the trial or hearing and be subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.                                                                                                                                                                    

(B) The statement must be an audio or video recorded statement, a written statement signed by the witness, or a statement given under oath.                                                                                                             

(C) The judge must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior statement was made under circumstances indicating trustworthiness.

The CCA emphasized that

[t]o be admissible as substantive evidence via Rule 803(26), a statement must first be admissible as a prior inconsistent statement via Rule 613(b). That rule provides that ‘[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless and until the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require.

The admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence will often turn, therefore, on whether the witness testifies in an inconsistent manner.  As the CCA explained, the witness must deny the statement, equivocate about having made the statement, or testify inconsistently and then testify that he or she does not recall making the prior inconsistent statement.  Finally, the court noted that nothing in Rule 803(26) “permits the admission of a witness’s prior statement in its entirety.”

The full opinion can be found here. 

State v. Anderson – The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses a Finding of Exigent Circumstances

By Stevie Phillips

Deputies were dispatched to Stoney Anderson’s neighborhood at about 1 a.m. in response to an unknown disturbance involving shots fired.  They encountered a car leaving Anderson’s home.  The occupants told them that they were coming from a small get together and had not heard any shots.  Nonetheless, the deputies proceeded to Anderson’s home and walked around to the back of the house.

As the deputies were walking onto the back deck, Anderson exited the house holding a duffle bag.  When asked, he told them that he had not heard any shots.  At this point, however, the deputies could smell marijuana and saw several people sitting at the kitchen table.  They then entered Anderson’s home and eventually searched the duffle bag where they found marijuana and paraphernalia. 

Before trial, Anderson moved to suppress the evidence found in the bag.  The trial court denied his motion on the basis that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless search, namely that the deputies were responding to an immediate risk of serious harm to themselves and others based on their concern that the bag contained a weapon. 

On appeal, Anderson argued that, even if there were exigent circumstances, those circumstances could not support the search of his bag because the deputies created the exigency when they unconstitutionally intruded into the curtilage of his home.  The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed.

In the Court’s analysis, Anderson’s back deck was “an area to which the activity of home life extends” and therefore plainly within the curtilage of his home.  The Court also determined that the deputies’ intrusion onto the deck without a warrant was unreasonable because they had no information connecting Anderson’s house to the disturbance.  Because any risk to the deputies’ safety resulted from their violation of Anderson’s constitutional rights, even a reasonable fear for their safety could not support the search of Anderson’s bag.

In sum, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not apply if the police themselves create the exigency.  Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857-58 (2011).  Case dismissed. 

The full opinion can be found here. 

TN Court of Criminal Appeals Finds Video Must Be Reviewed by Trial Court

by Lee Davis

• State of Tennessee v. Barry D. McCoy

The State of Tennessee appealed a lower court’s ruling denying their request to admit evidence of a video-recorded interview of a minor victim. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the lower court made a mistake by reaching the constitutional question before it was ripe for review and the ruling was vacated and remanded for reconsideration. 

Barry D. McCoy was charged with seven counts of rape of a child and submitted to a bench trial. The state moved to introduce a video interview of the victim as evidence. McCoy objected and the lower court ruled that it would not be admitted on three grounds: 1) the video was hearsay and was not covered by any exception; 2) admission of the video would violate McCoy’s right to confront a witness against him; and 3) the code at issue in the case, T.C.A Section 24-7-123, was unconstitutional as legislative overreach into judicial authority. The court believed that by enacting such a statute the legislature had violated the separation of powers doctrine by engaging in what is clearly a judicial function.

The Court of Criminal Appeals says that lower court jumped ahead of itself. The court should not have ruled on the constitutionality of the statute without first having reviewed the video recording to determine whether it would actually qualify for admission under the terms of the statute. The court could not know then if the statute was applicable to the case. If it didn’t apply,  then the constitutionality of the statute is moot. Because the trial court did not determine the statute’s applicability to the video in this case, the Court found that the constitutional challenge was not yet ripe for review and the lower court’s ruling was vacated. 

To read the full opinion, click here.

Earlier:

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Says that Post-Conviction Petitions Must Contain Specific Facts, Defendants Can’t Simply Check Boxes

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Affirms Revocation of Probation for Weapons Possession

TN Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses Evidence Tampering Conviction

• State of Tennessee v. Ashlee N. Appleton

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals decided the case of Ashlee Appleton last week. A jury convicted Appleton of tampering with evidence. The case centers around a murder that occurred on September 8, 2009. There are no accusations that Appleton had any involvement in the murder itself; however, Appleton was charged with tampering with evidence because she admitted to disposing of the gun that was used to commit the murder.

According to Appleton's written confession, given voluntarily after being advised of her Miranda rights, Appleton was at the house with a bunch of her friends. While she was standing in the yard of the house, she heard a pop that sounded like a firework from the other side of the house. She immediately got in her car with some of her friends and drove off. Amidst her journey back to Chattanooga, Jeresse Edwards, the accused shooter, informed Appleton that he had the gun in her car. Wanting to get the gun out of her car, Appelton said she threw the gun off a bridge around the Nickajack Dam.

The State relied on this evidence at trial. Once Appleton was convicted, she appealed to this Court arguing that the State did not satisfy their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that she tampered with the evidence.

The Court of Appeals agreed. The standard used by the Court was "corpus delicti", which means the "body of the crime." In order to obtain a conviction, the State must prove the corpus delicti of tampering with evidence. Two elements are required to prove the corpus delicti: first, that a certain result has been produced, and, second, that the result was created through criminal agency. Because of this standard, the Court reasoned, when a Defendant confesses to a certain crime, some corroborating evidence is required to establish the corpus delicti of the offense charged. The problem with the State's case, the Court held, was that they did not produce enough corroborating evidence to prove that Appleton tampered with the evidence. Specifically, the defendant never admitted to knowing that a gun had been fired, or that anyone had been killed. Further, investigators never found the gun, and the State did not produce any evidence that the Defendant had knowledge that the gun had been used in a crime. Without this corroborating evidence, the Court held, the conviction must be reversed.

Sixth Circuit vacates bank fraud conviction

In a surprising development, the 6^th Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that a Tennessee businessman’s conviction for bank fraud be vacated. The 6^th Circuit in the case, U.S. vs. Parkes, held that the jury convicted Timothy Parkes with insufficient evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 6^th Circuit also held that the lower court improperly excluded motive evidence critical to the defense. 

Mr. Parkes’ business made car floor mats and, in the course of conducting that business, borrowed money from a local bank. The business suffered enormous losses when a new manufacturing process failed, resulting in the mats melting in intense summer sun. The business eventually decided to begin importing its mats from China, and essentially acted as a distributor. This decision allowed the business to keep going, but it still owed more than $2 million to the bank. 

The bank also honored bounced checks of the business, essentially converting those amounts into new loans. Soon the loan size exceeded lending limits. To avoid FDIC scrutiny, the bank president falsified entries on its books to make it appear that the amount loaned had gone to several different shell companies. Prosecutors charged Mr. Parkes with participating in the scheme based on a vague fax from the business to the bank. However, there was no evidence that Mr. Parkes was the author of the fax, which was subject to a few alternate explanations. In addition, although the bank president pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement requiring cooperation, the government never introduced his testimony to establish that Mr. Parkes intended that fraudulent bank entries be made.

What the jury did not hear was that the bank president had been embezzling from the bank for years. He may have made the false entries on his own to avoid triggering FDIC scrutiny of his own malfeasance. In addition, the jury did not hear how the bank president had concealed loans exceeding limits from other businesses. Critically, of course, this would have explained to the jury why the bank president might have done this for Mr. Parkes’ business without Mr. Parkes’ intending that it be done. 

The lower court excluded all of this, saying that telling the jury that the bank president was an embezzler would discredit any testimony that he might give. The 6^th Circuit held that it was relevant to Mr. Parkes’ defense in that it spoke to his motive, or lack thereof. The Court of Appeals also held that the relevance of an item has to be judged in relation to the specific issues present in the case. What may be unfairly prejudicial in one case could be pertinent in another. 

The 6^th Circuit, acting through Judges Ray Kethledge, Jane Branstetter Stranch, and District Judge James Gwin, ordered that Mr. Parkes’ conviction be vacated, and that an acquittal be entered.

Click here to view the full opinion.

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