Interesting Sixth Circuit Opinion regarding Miranda Rights And Public Safety Exception

An interesting opinion, especially in light of the recent Boston Marathon bombing and subsequent arrest, is the Sixth Circuit case of U.S. v. Hodge. In Hodge, a suspect’s home was raided by police and a bomb was discovered after the suspect divulged its existence during questioning by police that took place without reading the suspect his Miranda rights. The issue before the court was whether evidence of the bomb gleaned from his statements to police should be suppressed. The Sixth Circuit held: no, it should not, that the questioning was valid due to the public safety exception to Miranda.

The case began when an informant approached police in Calhoun County, Michigan to say that an acquaintance, Lonnie Hodge, was using a one pot meth making method known as “shake and bake.” The method requires combining the ingredients of methamphetamine into a single bottle and shaking it until the drug is properly formed. The informant further said that Hodge had a pipe bomb and a black rifle that he suspected was an AK-47.

The police investigated Hodge by going through the list of pseudoephedrine purchasers and coordinating with neighboring police departments who were also investigating the man. After gathering sufficient evidence, the police were able to obtain a search warrant for Hodge’s home.

When police arrived things did not begin well. They knocked down the door to be greeted by a 6-foot 6, 320-pound Hodge waiving a screwdriver and screaming incoherently. Eventually Hodge was subdued and removed from the premises for questioning. A few minutes later, once Hodge calmed down, an officer asked whether Hodge he had anything in his house such as a meth lab or a pipe bomb that could hurt officers. Hodge said no. A few minutes later Hodge said that there was a bomb in the house. The police then pressed him for more information and he admitted that there was a pipe bomb, giving the location of the device that was eventually disarmed by the bomb expert. A subsequent search of the house uncovered drugs, though not meth, and a black rifle.

Hodge asked the trial court to suppress evidence of the pipe bomb, saying that the officer’s failure to read him his Miranda rights meant that the fruits of the interrogation should be inadmissible in court. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the bomb should be admitted given the pubic safety exception established by the Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles as well as the inevitable discovery doctrine.

The Sixth Circuit said that in some cases “overriding considerations of public safety” can permit officers to omit reading a suspect his or her Miranda rights before questioning. The Court held that because bombs, especially pipe bombs, are by their very nature unstable and could explode at any time, they posed a real and present danger to all the officers at Hodge’s house.

Additionally, the Sixth Circuit wrote that even if a Miranda violation had occurred, the pipe bomb would still not be suppressed due to the inevitable discovery doctrine. This is because the police had a valid warrant to search the home and, given the bomb’s location, would have eventually discovered it even without Hodge warning them in advance.

To read the full opinion, click here.

Supreme Court Addresses Whether Drug Dog Sniffs Are Up To Snuff

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Tuesday in Florida v. Harris that prosecutors are not required to present evidence detailing the stellar records of police dogs before their results can be used in court. The ruling, written by Justice Elena Kagan, said that courts should subject sniff tests by drug dogs to the same scrutiny given to other issues that police use to demonstrate probable cause prior to a search, and no more.

Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, said that the question should be whether all the facts surrounding the dog’s sniff alert would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search would turn up evidence of a crime.

The ruling by the Supreme Court overturns an earlier decision by the Florida Supreme Court about a drug dog named Aldo. Aldo had been trained by police in Liberty County, FL to sniff for marijuana, cocaine, heroin, ecstasy and methamphetamine. During a routine traffic stop in 2006, Aldo gave a signal to his handler that he detected something in the truck.

A search was performed by officers and 200 loose pseudoephedrine pills, 8,000 matches, a bottle of hydrochloric acid, antifreeze and iodine were discovered. In combination these ingredients make methamphetamine, but individually they are not things Aldo was trained to detect. The man was arrested and charged and later appealed the issue asking that a judge throw out the evidence obtained during the search given that the defense claimed Aldo’s search was not a sufficient basis for probable cause to search the vehicle.

The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, saying that the police lacked probable cause to search the truck. The Florida Court claimed that prosecutors should have to present evidence of training, certification records, field performance records and other objective evidence concerning a drug dog’s abilities and experience.

The Supreme Court disagreed, voting unanimously to reverse the Florida high court. The Court said that such a lengthy laundry list of documents are not needed to support the reliability of a drug sniffing dog.

The Court, in an odd coincidence, is preparing to release a second opinion concerning drug-sniffing dogs. The second case involves officers who brought a police dog up to a private residence. The issue for the justices to decide is whether judges may issue search warrants for private residences when a drug-sniffing dog outside the home reacts as if it smells drugs inside.

To read the full opinion, click here.

Source: “Supreme Court: Police Dog Ability Doesn't Need To Be Extensively Tested, 'Sniff Is Up To Snuff,” by, published at HuffingtonPost.com.

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Looking Through Your Smartphone: Electronic Pocket Litter and Police Searches

U.S. Supreme Court to Rule on DUI Forced Blood Draws

Tiny Typo Leads to Flawed Warrant and Excluded Evidence

What may have seemed like a small typo on a warrant amounted to enough reason for a judge to prevent prosecutors from using evidence collected as a result of the raid. The case involves a search of a Knox County driving school, a company operated by a retired homicide investigator.

The former murder detective, Don Wiser, has been accused of taking money in exchange for handing over certificates for having completed his driving school. The Sherriff’s Office says it raided Wiser’s office after two undercover officers went to the school and walked out with paperwork claiming they’d attended a 16-hour course when they really only spent two hours at the facility. Wiser vehemently denies the charges and says he is being targeted by the Sheriff’s department because he’s operating a competing driving school that has taken money away from the county.

So far Wiser appears to have clearly won the first round of the legal battle. His defense attorney pointed out that there was an error in the search warrant used by Knox County sheriff’s officers when they raided his business. What was the trouble exactly? The wrong date appeared on the paperwork.

The raid was carried out at his business on April 14, 2012, but the search warrant incorrectly listed the year as 2011. The Assistant District Attorney in charge of the case pointed out that there were several other places on the warrant that clearly indicated the year was 2012 and that the typo only occurred once. However, this was not enough for Knox County Criminal Court Judge Steve Sword.

Judge Sword said that while he might have agreed with prosecutors that the error was simply a typo, it did not matter because state law on the subject is clear. He said Tennessee rules left him no choice but to throw out the warrant as legally flawed. Given the flaw in the warrant, all evidence collected as a result of the warrant was also excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Tennessee is one state that does not recognize the concept known as “good faith exception”. Other states and the federal system rely on the principle which says that so long as an officer has good faith in believing that the warrant he or she is exercising is valid, the evidence obtained as a result of such a good faith search can still be used.

In this case, the warrant says that the information used a basis for the search was obtained a year before the warrant was actually executed. That long of a gap makes the information too old to act on and thus an improper basis for the search.

Read:“Judge: Typo on search warrant of business means it's no good,” by Jamie Satterfield, published at KnoxNews.com.

Looking Through Your Smartphone: Electronic Pocket Litter and Police Searches

A recent article discussed a seemingly boring but ultimately important issue that may be raised before the Supreme Court in the coming session: pocket litter. “Pocket litter” is a phrase used in law enforcement circles to refer to items of miscellaneous information carried on a person. This comes into play when a person is arrested or otherwise detained by an officer and they are subject to a search.

When law enforcement officers arrest someone, they conduct a thorough search of the suspect and his or her immediate possessions. This is what is known as a “search incident to arrest.” Any and all items found during this search are deemed admissible in Court. During a typical search officers are trained to look for items that might provide useful evidence for the case or that might cause harm to themselves or others. Another use of such searches is to gather information that might provide a clue about other individuals involved in the alleged criminal activity.

Seemingly mundane items found in people’s pockets or purses can provide a significant amount of information. Slips of paper with quickly written messages, phone numbers, names, addresses business cards, etc. all make for great leads. Beyond these obvious examples, scraps of paper including receipts, bus passes or airplane tickets also provide valuable information to those seeking to identify a suspected criminal and any possible criminal associates.

One thing that has happened on this front given the technological changes seen recently is that the items that often make up such pocket litter have changed. Originally the term referred only to small scraps of paper generally containing only a relatively small amount of information. Today, the term has grown to include electronic devices such as smartphones, tablets, iPods, and even laptops from which huge amounts of information can be collected. These devices carry voicemails, call and text logs, photos, Internet browser history and even GPS information.

The question facing many appellate courts today is just how far such a search can go when high value electronic pocket litter is involved. Cellphones in particular present a puzzling gray area, as there have been conflicting rulings between various U.S. Circuit Courts. This conflict makes it more likely that the issue will end up before the Supreme Court at some point to help clarify the issue. Judges confronted with such facts often find themselves lost, comparing cellphones to diaries while trying to analogize to prior cases from decades ago that have little if any relevance to the challenges they face today. The Supreme Court should step in and shed light on the issue, hopefully catching the legal system up to changes in technology.

Read: “Pocket Litter: The Evidence That Criminals Carry,” by Scott Stewart, published at RightSideNews.com.

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U.S. Supreme Court to Rule on DUI Forced Blood Draws
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The CCA, Tenn. R. Evid. 803(26), and Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence

By Stevie Phillips

In State v. Ackerman, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals addressed Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26), a hearsay exception adopted in 2009 that allows admission of some prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. 

The Rule states that the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule:

A statement otherwise admissible under Rule 613(b) if all of the following conditions are satisfied:      

(A) The declarant must testify at the trial or hearing and be subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.                                                                                                                                                                    

(B) The statement must be an audio or video recorded statement, a written statement signed by the witness, or a statement given under oath.                                                                                                             

(C) The judge must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior statement was made under circumstances indicating trustworthiness.

The CCA emphasized that

[t]o be admissible as substantive evidence via Rule 803(26), a statement must first be admissible as a prior inconsistent statement via Rule 613(b). That rule provides that ‘[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless and until the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require.

The admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence will often turn, therefore, on whether the witness testifies in an inconsistent manner.  As the CCA explained, the witness must deny the statement, equivocate about having made the statement, or testify inconsistently and then testify that he or she does not recall making the prior inconsistent statement.  Finally, the court noted that nothing in Rule 803(26) “permits the admission of a witness’s prior statement in its entirety.”

The full opinion can be found here. 

TN Court of Criminal Appeals Rejects Petition From Defendant With Life Sentence

• State of Tennessee v. David Edward Niles

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals recently rejected a petition from a man serving a life sentence for first-degree murder. The defendant, David Edward Niles, was convicted in January of 2010 for the death of Laura Parker. Niles claimed that circuit Court Judge Robert Crigler erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence that was sized during the search of his residence. Niles also said there was not sufficient evidence to convict him and that the judge abused his discretion in denying a motion for money for a psychiatrist.

According to the appeal, public defenders working for Niles discovered he had told one of his jailers that God told him to kill Parker because she was an unfit mother to their 4-year-old son. Niles then told his attorneys that he initially believed God told him this but later though it may have been the devil. 

Judge Crigler ruled that Niles had already been examined once and was found competent to stand trial. The Court here agreed, saying that Niles provided “only unsupported assertions” that a psychiatrist might have been of help in his case, failing to show that testimony from an expert was necessary in order to receive a fair trial.

Before his trial, Niles attempted to have evidence seized at his residence suppressed. A detective, Brian Crews, had asked Niles’ wife, Patricia, about ammunition for the gun her husband was found with the night of the shooting. Patricia allowed Crews and another detective to enter the home to get the ammunition. While they were in the house they found receipts for a replacement barrel and firing pins. Both items ended up being important pieces of evidence that were used to prove that he had planned the killing weeks in advance. 

Crews also asked if police could have a day planner and the computer at the home, but his wife objected saying she needed it for schoolwork. The detective ended up making copies of both. The Court decided that Mrs. Niles freely, specifically and intelligently gave her consent to the search. The day planner and computer were never used as evidence so the issue regarding their copying is moot. 

The Court of Criminal Appeals also said that the record of the case showed that there was “overwhelming evidence of premeditation,” including evidence indicating that an attempt was made to conceal the crime prior to the murder. 

Niles confessed to another one of his jailer’s that he had done research on the internet about how to defeat ballistics testing by using a replacement barrel and firing pin. Thus the Court found that “there was sufficient evidence supporting Niles’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder.”

To read the full opinion, click here. 

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U.S. Supreme Court Decides Case on Potential Unreliable Eyewitness Testimony

• Perry v. New Hampshire

The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided the case of Perry v. New Hampshire. We originally wrote about the Perry case back in September. The defendant in the case was identified by a witness while also standing next to a police officer. When the witness was first asked for a description of the person suspected of committing a burglary, the witness said he was a "tall black man." When asked by an officer if she could provide a more detailed description, she pointed to the defendant standing with another officer and identified him as the suspect of the burglary. The question for the court was whether there must be police misconduct to successfully exclude unduly suggestive eyewitness identification evidence as a violation of due process. In a more broad sense, the Court was asked to determine if the standards for introducing eyewitness identifications should be strengthened due to the inherent unreliability of them.

In and 8 to 1 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the court held that some sort of police misconduct is required for a judge to throw out and eyewitness identification. Specifically, the eyewitness testimony will not be thrown out unless it can be shown that the police have manipulated circumstances to produce a certain outcome. Justice Ginsburg cited to the purpose behind this rule as the reasoning for neglecting to strengthen the standards for admitting an eyewitness identification. The purpose behind it, she stated, is to deter police misconduct. Specifically, she said "when there is no misconduct, there is nothing to deter." By declining to hold otherwise, the Court left the job to the jury to determine the reliability of an eyewitness identification. By allowing the identification to be admitted, the jury will still have the opportunity to hear any rebuttal by the defense. The Court felt this was enough to surpass the inherent unreliable nature of an eyewitness identification.

Justice Sonya Sotomayor was the only dissenting Justice. She disagreed with the purpose of the rule of requiring police misconduct. According to her the purpose of the rule is to ensure a fair trial, not to deter police misconduct. Anything that weakens the opportunity for the defendant to have a fair trial should not be admitted. She stated in her dissent,

"Whether the police have created the suggestive circumstances intentionally or inadvertently... it is no more or less likely to misidentify the perpetrator. It is no more or less powerful to the jury."

This decision is quite controversial given the multitude of scientific studies that have proven that eyewitness identification is unreliable. It is no secret many convictions have been based off of eyewitness identification. Many of those convicted based on eyewitness identifications were later exonerated when technology progressed into the the use of DNA testing. It may be surprising to some that the Court has ignored the evidence of the this blatant unreliability, especially when there is a chance that many convictions are tainted with unreliable identifications. It will be interesting to see when the Court will be presented with this issue next. It is almost certain to rise again.

Sixth Circuit Reverses District Court's Refusal to Suppress Evidence Resulting From an Unreasonable Search and Seizure

• United States v. Beauchamp

The Sixth Circuit decided U.S. v. Gevoyl Beauchamp, yesterday. Beauchamp pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine but later appealed arguing that the District Court was wrong when it refused to suppress evidence of drugs found pursuant to a search of Beauchamp. Specifically, he argued that the search of his person was unlawfully conducted.  It was without reasonable suspicion.

At 2:30 am on February 15, 2008 law enforcement was patrolling near the Jacob Price housing project in Covington, Kentucky due to an increase in drug activity. Officer Dees saw Beauchamp talking with another individual. When Beauchamp saw the officer, he hurriedly walked away without making eye contact. Officer Dees told his partner, Officer Fain to stop the "suspicious subject." Officer Fain followed Beauchamp in his patrol car, parking next to an iron fence where Beauchamp stood. He told Beauchamp to stop and walk back towards his patrol car. The officer testified that he looked "very nervous, visibly shaking." Officer Fain asked Beauchamp where he had been and where he was going. Beauchamp gave vague answers but complied with the officer's requests. Officer Fain then frisked Beauchamp for weapons. While conducting the frisk, he asked Beauchamp if he had anything the officer should be aware of. Beauchamp replied that he did not. The Officer didn't find any weapons, but then asked Beauchamp if he could conduct a further search. Beauchamp said yes. Officer Fain noticed plastic hidden in Beauchamp's underwear.

Officer Dees then arrived and recognized Beauchamp from previous encounters. Officer Fain gave Officer Dees a look indicating he found something while conducting the search. Once Officer Dees began to search his pants, Beauchamp tried to run. He was stopped and Officer Fain found the plastic which contained rocks of crack cocaine.

Beauchamp filed a motion to suppress the evidence found from the search at trial, but the district court refused. He appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Court began its analysis by stating that there are three different types of permissible encounters between civilians and police officers: 1) consensual encounters which may be initiated without any form of suspicion; 2) the investigative detention, which if non-consensual, must be supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and 3) the arrest, valid only if supported by probable cause. Since the Fourth Amendment applies to all searches and seizures, the Court first analyzed whether the stop of Beauchamp was a seizure, warranting Fourth Amendment protection. A seizure occurs when, after looking at all circumstances surrounding the event, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. The Court held that a reasonable person in Beauchamp's position would not believe that he was free to leave. He had been pursued by both officers and instructed to stop and walk back towards Officer Fain. After being pursued by both officers, Beauchamp would have been reasonable in believing that the two officers were targeting him, thus believing that he was not free to leave. The Court held that this was a seizure and that the seizure occurred once Beauchamp and Officer Fain spoke at the fence.

The Court then analyzed whether the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop and search Beauchamp. In order to do so, the Court had to examine the totality of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the stop. There were five facts the district court alluded to: that Beauchamp was 1) recognized by an officer from previous encounters, 2) at 2:30 in the morning, 3) in a housing project that was the source of many drug complaints, 4) with another individual, and 5) he hurriedly walked away from the police while avoiding eye contact.

The court stated that the first fact is not applicable to this analysis because Officer Dees only recognized Beauchamp after the search had already begun. The second and third facts, the court said, should be applied carefully. The Court explained that just because Beauchamp was in a drug-prone housing project at 2:30 in the morning, was not enough to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Officer Dees did not see Beauchamp engage in anything resembling drug activity; all he saw was Beauchamp with another person before he walked away. The fourth fact - that Beauchamp was seen with another person - is not indicative of criminal activity. The fifth fact - hurriedly walking away from the officer without making eye contact - is also not enough to establish reasonable suspicion. The Sixth Circuit has regularly held that merely walking away from the police, without any other suspicious conduct, does not establish reasonable suspicion.

Without reasonable suspicion, the search of Beauchamp was unlawful. The Court further held that although Beauchamp consented to a search of his person, consent that is obtained after an illegal seizure is tainted and does not justify a search. This rule was articulated by the United States Supreme Court and has been regularly applied in the Sixth Circuit.

Because the initial seizure was unlawful, the subsequent search of Beauchamp was unlawful regardless of his consent. Given this conclusion, the Court held that the evidence should have been suppressed. The Court reversed the District Court and remanded for further proceedings.

TN Supreme Court Affirms Defendant's Four Violent Felony Convictions

• State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Davis

The TN Supreme Court decided today to affirm the conviction of Christopher Lee Davis for aggravated robbery, carjacking, attempt to commit especially aggravated kidnapping, and attempt to commit first degree murder. The Defendant was one of two men who pulled up to a car wash in Trousdale County planning to rob a man washing his car. The victim, Glen McDaniel, was approached by the two men wearing bandanas over their faces. Both men were African American, and both men were tall. The Defendant was wearing a red hat that had a depiction of a $100 bill embroidered on it. The two men forced Mr. McDaniel into his car, pointing a gun at him the entire time. He drove to an ATM where he was forced to empty his bank account. Mr. McDaniel was told to drive back to the car wash where he pleaded with the two men to take his car and leave him there. They refused. The Defendant first stated that Mr. McDaniel was going with them. At that point, the other man got a roll of black duct tape and began to bind Mr. McDaniel's arms behind his back. Mr. McDaniel then put up a fight. Because of the struggle, the Defendant exclaimed that he was going to kill Mr. McDaniel "right here!" Mr. McDaniel was able to get away on foot while the two men drove off in his Monte Carlo.

The next day, after obtaining a description from Mr. McDaniel of the two men and the Monte Carlo, officers found the car parked at a boat dock. They began the process of investigating the car when a white Crown Victoria slowly pulled into the parking lot where the Monte Carlo sat. According to officers the two men in the car were African American, and when they saw the officers, "they're eyes got as wide as saucers." They jerked the car in the opposite direction, back onto the road and turned around to head back the opposite way. One of the officers, Detective Tarlecky, suspected the people in the Crown Victoria to be the suspects because, in his experience, carjackers often leave cars in remote places only to come back and continue to strip the car of its parts. Detective Tarlecky felt he had enough reasonable suspicion to pull the Crown Victoria over. The driver of the car consented to a search of the car. Pursuant to that search, Detective Tarlecky found the key to the Monte Carlo. At that point, the officer arrested both men. A subsequent search of the Defendant's home also yielded various instruments of the crime including the hat, the bandanas, and the missing cd player from the Monte Carlo.

At trial, the Defendant was convicted on all counts. He was sentence to a total of 49 years in prison. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Defendant argues, however, that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to pull the car over. Thus, all the evidence recovered from the warrantless search should have been suppressed.

The Supreme Court stated that in order to determine whether the trial court was correct in concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to search the car, it must examine all the fact surrounding the situation. It stated that reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause, and that it is "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the subject of a stop of criminal activity." The Court agreed that the officer had reasonable suspicion. The facts that led to a reasonable suspicion included the general description of the suspects, the fact that the car had not been completely stripped of valuable items, the abrupt and evasive behavior of the Crown Victoria's driver, and the startled and suspicious demeanor of both occupants in the Crown Victoria. Given the totality of the circumstances, the Court explained, a rational trier of fact could have found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to search the car.

The other issue on appeal was whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient enough to warrant a conviction for attempt to commit first degree murder. In order to satisfy the elements of attempt to commit first degree murder, the state must prove that there exists premeditation and that the Defendant had the intent to commit the crime. The Court again relied heavily on the specific facts to determine whether the intent to kill was present, including the fact that the Defendant pointed his gun at the victim the entire time, and also the fact that he stated he was going to kill the victim "right here." The Court also held that the Defendant's conduct was premeditated since he arrived at the scene with a gun and duct tape, expecting to use both items. A reasonable jury could infer from these facts that the Defendant had the intent to kill and that his actions were premeditated. This was enough to satisfy the TN Statute for attempt to commit first degree murder.

While the Court ultimately affirmed all four convictions, it remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if his sentence (a combination of periods of years of incarceration, some to be served consecutively and others to be served concurrently) was calculated correctly.

TN Court of Criminal Appeals Upholds Suppression of Evidence Based on an Invalid Search Warrant

• Tennessee v. Bob Spivey and Misty Buckner

The TN Court of Criminal Appeals recently upheld the dismissal of all charges against Bob Spivey and Misty Buckner based on the suppression of all evidence that resulted from a search warrant executed on Misty Buckner's home. Both Spivey and Buckner were indicted with possession with intent to sell or deliver more than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a class B felony. Both defendants moved to suppress all evidence obtained from a search of Buckner's home because the search warrant was unconstitutionally inadequate. The trial court agreed with the defendants and dismissed all charges, and the State subsequently appealed.

The search warrant described the target location as "506 Christie Street, a single story, single family dwelling with tan siding... it sits on the northeast corner of Christie Street and Brigance Avenue." The warrant was based on the information of an informant who saw a controlled substance inside the Buckner home. The 506 Christie Street property actually contains two buildings: one is tan and one is blue. Misty Buckner's home is blue. The tan building, having first been described as a detached garage, was actually occupied by another renter at the time of the search. The officer who sought to enforce the warrant, Officer McDowell, conceded that he misread the satellite pictures by labeling the house "tan", but that no one ever had any interest in searching the tan building in the first place. None of the officers entered or searched the tan building. Officer McDowell claims the only thing wrong with the warrant is it mistakes the color of the house.

The defendants argue, however, that the warrant is unconstitutionally invalid because it failed to distinguish the target building from the only tan building on the property. Because of this, the warrant authorized a search on the tan building, which was occupied by a person unrelated to this investigation.

The Court of Appeals started first by examining the rule used in the State of Tennessee regarding whether a warrant is unconstitutionally invalid. According to the Court, both federal and state laws require a warrant to "particularly" describe the place to be searched. The Supreme Court of TN has stated that the use of the word "particularly" shows that the legislature "intended the search warrant to be clear of ambiguity as to the place to be searched." This test ensures that the subject of the search does not endure an unreasonable search, and prevents the officer from searching the premises of a person unrelated to the matter by mistake.

The Court elaborated on a particular test that must be met to determine if the warrant is particular enough:

The requirement of a particular description of the place to be searched is met by a description which particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others, and enables the officer to locate the place to be searched with reasonable certainty without leaving it to his discretion.

Based on this test, the warrant is invalid because while it included an adequate description of the subject property, that same description authorized law enforcement to search the home of another. This is not particular enough under state and federal statutes.

The State further argued, using previous case law, that the defect in the warrant is "cured" by Officer McDowell's personal knowledge that the defendants lived in the blue building rather than the tan building. Previous cases have allowed this defense only when the officer personally knew or could prove that he was highly familiar with the area to be searched. While Officer McDowell may have known a little information about the property, the Court held that the record does not prove he had any personal knowledge of the property or the defendants.

After reviewing all the evidence and binding law, the Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal.